First published in Aljazeera English
In 2011, the colorful tents of Change Square flourished with hope and a dream of a dignified life. Three years later, like the tents, hope of regime change has disappeared for many independent revolutionaries.
While many positive steps have been taken in the past three years, including the official removal of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power, the creation of a transitional unity government, and the completion of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a complete break with the past is yet to be seen.
On February 21, 2012 on the first anniversary of the Yemeni Revolution, an uncontested "election" brought Saleh's vice president to power, based on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)'s power transfer agreement. This deal, signed on November 23, 2011, was a great blow to the independent revolutionaries, as it empowered traditional forces over those calling for radical change and cosmetically addressed their demands.
In 2011, prior to this agreement, the regime, that had once neglected the youth, was forced to interact with them, due to their street power, which expanded political bargaining beyond the traditional political elite. Yet the GCC blocked this process, emphasising instead traditional patronage politics.
Business as usual
The demands of the street extended beyond the removal of the president to include comprehensive change to the entire political structure, which has been the cause of marginalisation. Many independent youth felt that the traditional opposition figures who worked side by side with the old regime do not believe in real change and have co-opted the revolution for personal and political gains.
Creating a national unity government, while politically a positive move, meant that both traditional opposition and former ruling party members are in charge of government positions, transpiring in recruitment of government employees based on party loyalties rather than expertise. This marginalised a number of independent qualified technocrats, leaving management of many ministries to those who had no proper knowledge and blocking any reform of government institution, which is a necessary step to break away from the past.
Furthermore, the 2014 budget [Ar] allocated $11.3m to the Tribes' Affairs Authority, which will be spent on monthly salaries for tribal leaders. In comparison, as the Yemen Times highlighted, the budget projected for Yemen's Coast Guard Authority is $7.2m.
The fact that this line item remains in the budget post-revolution demonstrates that the transitional government is not keen on moving away from the patronage system towards a modern civic state on the basis of equal citizenship, social justice, and a plural political system.
According to a Parliamentary report [Ar], the same budget did not allocate any funds for the implementation of the NDC recommendations. This has made it difficult for people to trust the government's political will to move forward with the decisions.
The NDC brought together 565 members from various backgrounds; seven percent of the seats were allocated to independent youth. The 300-page NDC recommendations [Ar] are significant, and emphasize revolutionary demands of equal citizenship and justice. For example, The forth recommendation of the state-building working group states, "All citizens shall be equal in rights and duties before the law, without distinction based on sex, race, origin, colour, religion, sect, doctrine, opinion, or economic or social standing." Yet the fear is that such recommednations will remain simply ink on paper, and like many laws in Yemen will not be implemented.
While NDC members claimed that these recommendations are "binding", there is no legislative provision that obliges either the government or the outdated parliament to carry them out.
In fact, many do not believe that these recommendations will in fact be implemented, pointing to the "20 points" as an example. Prior to the start of the NDC, the technical committee created to organise the NDC publically recommended a list of 20 points that are meant to rebuild trust between the South, the Houthis, and the government. This was supposed to be completed prior to the NDC, yet even after the end of the NDC, only a few of these points have been implemented. This begs the question: If these simple 20 points cannot be implemented, what will become of the remaining 300 page worth of recommendations?
Another example of lack of implementation lies in the absence of proper compensation for the injured revolutionaries. Despite a presidential decree ordering their treatment, many of them have been neglected and the government has provided little financial and medical support for them.
On February 9 Abdul Jabar al-Namer, a protester who was shot in the stomach in 2011 died waiting to travel abroad for further medical treatment. Unhappy with this situation, the youth have staged numerous protests and demonstrations in support of their injured fellows, and some of the wounded have gone on hunger strikes. Despite promises to address the situation, no serious action has yet been taken. To date, four lawsuits have been filed by injured revolutionaries and their families, yet there has been no change in the status quo.
Increasing violence
Although the presidential decrees aimed at restructuring the military were bold in their gaols, personal loyalties still control the army. In fact, Human Rights Watch reported that President Hadi informed them that "a general issue with the Yemeni military is that each brigade is formed from the same tribe." In his words, it is impossible to "remove a commander who commits an abuse because the commander will simply reject the decision and the brigade will stand by him."
This might explain why the committee setup by President Hadi to investigate the military attack on a funeral of a member of the Southern Movement in al-Dali last December has not yet provided any explanation or charged anyone. This lack of accountability is a natural consequence of the immunity law that provided protection for members of the former regime and enshrined this culture of impunity.
Violence by security institutions has continued against peaceful protesters, even on the anniversary of President Hadi's "election". On February 21, security forces shot at a large rally in Aden where peopledemonstrated against the outcomes of the NDC and called for secession. At the same time in the North, violent clashes between the Houthis, Salafis and tribal militias have persisted over the past months.
The NDC clearly did not succeed in addressing the main issues in the South or in the North.
There is no doubt that real change will take many years, yet the foundations need to be built correctly. With no real reform of government institutions, no rule of law, deteriorating economy and a catastrophic humanitarian situation, conflicts throughout Yemen have dramatically increased. Three years after the Yemeni revolution, we are left asking ourselves: Can the Yemen model really succeed? And can there be peace without justice?
Showing posts with label GCC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GCC. Show all posts
Saturday, February 22, 2014
Thursday, December 27, 2012
“Youth” Inclusion in Yemen: a Necessary Element for Success of political transition اليمن إشراك "الشباب" ضرورة لنجاح المرحلة الانتقالية
شهد تاريخ اليمن المعاصر عدة ثورات وانقلابات. ولكن ثورة ٢٠١١
لها جانب فريد ومتميز، وهو أن الشباب هم من قاد الثورة (على الأقل في
أولها) بمشاركة شعبية واسعة من كافة الأطياف، وهو ما جعل الثورة تتجاوز
دائرة النخبة السياسية. والسؤال الذي يطرح نفسه اليوم هو: أي دور "للشباب"
الذين أشعلوا جذوة الحراك السلمي الشعبي خلال المرحلة الانتقالية؟
وعلى الرغم من الدور الهام الذي لعبه الشباب في الثورة، فقد
تم إقصائهم من المفاوضات السياسية التي أدت إلى توقيع الخطة الانتقالية
(المبادرة الخليجية). كما أن هناك مؤشرات اليوم تشير إلى احتمال تهميش
الشباب في الحوار الوطني المقبل.
إن أحد المؤشرات الرئيسية لتغير الهيكل السياسي هو مدى
إشراك فئات غير تقليدية خارج الدائرة الصغيرة المغلقة في العملية السياسية.
ومن هنا، تحاول هذه الورقة أن تسلط الضوء على مدى إشراك الشباب في العملية
السياسية من خلال تعريف مفهوم "الشباب المستقل" في البداية، ثم التركيز
على دورهم في الثورة ودورهم الحالي والمحتمل في العملية الانتقالية.
Modern Yemen has witnessed previous revolutions and coups, but the revolution of 2011 had the unique aspect of being a youth led mass movement [at least at the beginning] with participation from people of various backgrounds, transcending the elite circle of politics. A common question arises: what role do the “youth” who ignited the mass protest movement play today in the transitional process?
While youth played a significant role in the revolution, they were sidelined in the political negotiations that led to the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition plan and there are indicators today that show their potential marginalization in the upcoming national dialogue process.
A key indicator for change in the political structure of the country is the level of political inclusion that transcends the traditional small inner circle. Hence, this paper attempts to review the level of “youth” inclusion, by first defining the “independent youth”, and focusing on their past, current and potential role in the transitional process.
Full paper found here.
Sunday, October 14, 2012
Time for Hadi to move beyond managing power struggles
First published in the Guardian's Comment is Free
With the support of the international community, President
Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi came to power in Yemen as the consensus candidate
– when the opposition coalition and the former ruling party signed an
agreement on political transition put forward by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC).
After months of turmoil, the agreement ended the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh but it marginalised a large segment of Yemeni society, including those who led the movement for change.
Hadi's "election" in February – in a national poll where he was the only candidate – did not sit well with many, but others welcomed it as a symbolic step to steer Yemen away from a potential civil war.
Some of Hadi's initial decrees surprised critics, giving people hope that he would lead Yemen independently. His decisions to reassign military and security officials from their posts, and his appointments – such as replacing the governor of Taiz – were widely welcomed.
Also, on 22 September he signed a decree authorising the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations during the 2011 uprising – though with the immunity law, the chances of prosecution are near impossible.
The immunity law, stipulated in the GCC agreement, is not the only obstacle. A continuing problem is that the GCC's transition agreement places a lot of importance on President Hadi, without any reference to what would happen in his absence. Analysts worry that this makes him an easy target for those who would benefit from derailing the transitional process.
Fearing for his life, Hadi has been protected by the military's First Armoured Division (FAD) which supported opposition protests against Saleh last year. The head of the FAD, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (a kinsman of ex-president Saleh who eventually turned against him) is known for his bloody past, making him more valuable as a friend than an enemy.
Hadi's relationship with Ali Mohsen is seen by many as one of convenience, where protection is exchanged for loyalty, and there are some worrying indicators that Ali Mohsen may be gaining influence through President Hadi's tacit and sometimes declared approval.
For example, people welcomed the creation of a new Presidential Protection Force made up of three brigades of the Republican Guard, headed by Saleh's son Ahmed Ali – and one brigade from the FAD – as essential first steps towards unifying the military.
However, the 314th brigade of the FAD that was affected by this decree was one that had refused to defect with Ali Mohsen during the uprising and always remained loyal to Saleh. Hence, this decree only reduced the power of Saleh loyalists, leaving intact Ali Mohsen's influence over the military.
The Hadi-Mohsen relationship instilled fear in people that the patronage system – one of the hallmarks of Saleh's rule – may continue under a different guise in favour of the Islamist party Islah, the dominant force in the traditional opposition, due to its close ties with Ali Mohsen.
According to reports by local newspapers, employees at the ministry of electricity filed an official complaint against the minister for employing his relatives and friends without merit. They listed 19 new employees all of whom are affiliated to Islah.
One government employee stated on condition of anonymity: "In the past, the minister would only employ his pro-regime friends. Today, the new minister brought his friends from the party to take over the leadership of some divisions without the required skills. It's like one mafia replaced another."
These practices might affect Hadi's credibility and thus affect the goals of the National Dialogue, which is one crucial test for the president.
Among other things, the dialogue intended to begin next month needs to build trust with the rebellious Houthis in the north and the separatists in the south. It is of vital importance for Hadi to address their grievances and include these marginalised yet powerful groups in the process for a successful dialogue.
So far, no members of the important technical committee for the National Dialogue are affiliated to the Southern Movement, though there is talk of the state issuing a public apology for past wars in the south and north – which may restore trust in the process and facilitate their involvement.
A widespread perception, though, is that the National Dialogue will only empower political parties and will neglect the people and their needs.
Last month, Hadi issued another decree to add six new members to the technical committee, four of whom are from the Islah party, shifting the balance. It also decreased the number of women to less than 30%, which has been commonly accepted as the minimum quota for women's participation in the various committees.
For Yemen to move forward, a sincere healing process needs to begin, and a bottom-up approach needs to replace the top-down elite model for the dialogue to succeed or else it will become just another political conference. If the National Dialogue fails, so will Hadi's legitimacy.
Another indicator that the leadership is not taking people's opinions into account is Hadi's recent statement praising the efficiency of drones and acknowledging his approval of the strikes which have resulted in many civilian deaths.
With no mention of the civilian casualties from his home province of Abyan, Hadi's legitimacy is slowly fading. A backlash against his statement was immediately felt in the country.
After his speech, Hadi quickly acquired new nicknames including "Abdu Drone Hadi", coined by activist Abdulrahman Alansy. "Exchanging local support with international glamour rather than striking balance between both will simply turn him into a Yemeni version of the weak and ineffective Karzai," said Ibrahim Mothana, youth activist and co-founder of the al-Watan party.
More than seven months into his presidency, it appears that Hadi is not interested in bargaining with the masses, and instead is focused on pleasing the inner political circle, extending the exclusionary politics of the Saleh era into the new transitional government.
Hadi should take on this historic responsibility with a vision for the country and move beyond managing the power struggles, which is what Saleh did for 33 years and which cost him the presidency. With all the difficulties Yemen is facing, it is not to his advantage to sideline revolutionaries and other important and powerful groups in Yemen, from whom he should gain his legitimacy.
Gone are the days when legitimacy only comes from a small inner circle. The extent to which the people are able to push for reforms will demonstrate whether Yemen will move towards a more inclusive political process.
After months of turmoil, the agreement ended the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh but it marginalised a large segment of Yemeni society, including those who led the movement for change.
Hadi's "election" in February – in a national poll where he was the only candidate – did not sit well with many, but others welcomed it as a symbolic step to steer Yemen away from a potential civil war.
Some of Hadi's initial decrees surprised critics, giving people hope that he would lead Yemen independently. His decisions to reassign military and security officials from their posts, and his appointments – such as replacing the governor of Taiz – were widely welcomed.
Also, on 22 September he signed a decree authorising the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations during the 2011 uprising – though with the immunity law, the chances of prosecution are near impossible.
The immunity law, stipulated in the GCC agreement, is not the only obstacle. A continuing problem is that the GCC's transition agreement places a lot of importance on President Hadi, without any reference to what would happen in his absence. Analysts worry that this makes him an easy target for those who would benefit from derailing the transitional process.
Fearing for his life, Hadi has been protected by the military's First Armoured Division (FAD) which supported opposition protests against Saleh last year. The head of the FAD, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (a kinsman of ex-president Saleh who eventually turned against him) is known for his bloody past, making him more valuable as a friend than an enemy.
Hadi's relationship with Ali Mohsen is seen by many as one of convenience, where protection is exchanged for loyalty, and there are some worrying indicators that Ali Mohsen may be gaining influence through President Hadi's tacit and sometimes declared approval.
For example, people welcomed the creation of a new Presidential Protection Force made up of three brigades of the Republican Guard, headed by Saleh's son Ahmed Ali – and one brigade from the FAD – as essential first steps towards unifying the military.
However, the 314th brigade of the FAD that was affected by this decree was one that had refused to defect with Ali Mohsen during the uprising and always remained loyal to Saleh. Hence, this decree only reduced the power of Saleh loyalists, leaving intact Ali Mohsen's influence over the military.
The Hadi-Mohsen relationship instilled fear in people that the patronage system – one of the hallmarks of Saleh's rule – may continue under a different guise in favour of the Islamist party Islah, the dominant force in the traditional opposition, due to its close ties with Ali Mohsen.
According to reports by local newspapers, employees at the ministry of electricity filed an official complaint against the minister for employing his relatives and friends without merit. They listed 19 new employees all of whom are affiliated to Islah.
One government employee stated on condition of anonymity: "In the past, the minister would only employ his pro-regime friends. Today, the new minister brought his friends from the party to take over the leadership of some divisions without the required skills. It's like one mafia replaced another."
These practices might affect Hadi's credibility and thus affect the goals of the National Dialogue, which is one crucial test for the president.
Among other things, the dialogue intended to begin next month needs to build trust with the rebellious Houthis in the north and the separatists in the south. It is of vital importance for Hadi to address their grievances and include these marginalised yet powerful groups in the process for a successful dialogue.
So far, no members of the important technical committee for the National Dialogue are affiliated to the Southern Movement, though there is talk of the state issuing a public apology for past wars in the south and north – which may restore trust in the process and facilitate their involvement.
A widespread perception, though, is that the National Dialogue will only empower political parties and will neglect the people and their needs.
Last month, Hadi issued another decree to add six new members to the technical committee, four of whom are from the Islah party, shifting the balance. It also decreased the number of women to less than 30%, which has been commonly accepted as the minimum quota for women's participation in the various committees.
For Yemen to move forward, a sincere healing process needs to begin, and a bottom-up approach needs to replace the top-down elite model for the dialogue to succeed or else it will become just another political conference. If the National Dialogue fails, so will Hadi's legitimacy.
Another indicator that the leadership is not taking people's opinions into account is Hadi's recent statement praising the efficiency of drones and acknowledging his approval of the strikes which have resulted in many civilian deaths.
With no mention of the civilian casualties from his home province of Abyan, Hadi's legitimacy is slowly fading. A backlash against his statement was immediately felt in the country.
After his speech, Hadi quickly acquired new nicknames including "Abdu Drone Hadi", coined by activist Abdulrahman Alansy. "Exchanging local support with international glamour rather than striking balance between both will simply turn him into a Yemeni version of the weak and ineffective Karzai," said Ibrahim Mothana, youth activist and co-founder of the al-Watan party.
More than seven months into his presidency, it appears that Hadi is not interested in bargaining with the masses, and instead is focused on pleasing the inner political circle, extending the exclusionary politics of the Saleh era into the new transitional government.
Hadi should take on this historic responsibility with a vision for the country and move beyond managing the power struggles, which is what Saleh did for 33 years and which cost him the presidency. With all the difficulties Yemen is facing, it is not to his advantage to sideline revolutionaries and other important and powerful groups in Yemen, from whom he should gain his legitimacy.
Gone are the days when legitimacy only comes from a small inner circle. The extent to which the people are able to push for reforms will demonstrate whether Yemen will move towards a more inclusive political process.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Want action? Visit Yemen, we promise you a unique emotional roller coaster
On the morning of April 27, I spent 8 hours with actors rehearsing for a play. One of the funniest actors Mohammed was present, and made us laugh until we almost cried. Four hours later, I ran into him again, but this time at the field hospital. He was one of the injured. Thank God it was only a minor injury, but it nevertheless made me feel so strange. Just a couple of hours ago we were in a room full of laughing people, later we were in a room full of injured people. Instead of the tears of laughter, tears of sadness filled me. The morning after, I saw Mohammed rehearsing again. He had a big smile and it was like nothing happened the day before.
This is the emotional roller coaster we are experiencing at the moment. It’s been three months since the start of the revolution and I am not only physically drained, but emotionally exhausted as well. Here is a diagram of my emotional ups and downs between January 15 until April 29.
The diagram was created after compiling a selection of important dates, mostly political, in the last three months, and designating how they made me feel: happy, sad, or in between. The dates I highlighted below do not encompass all important events, but they are just a selection of few to get an idea of the roller coaster we call Yemeni politics. (key: 2 happy, 1 in between, 0 unhappy)
Summary of the emotional roller coaster
January 15 ☺ Yemenis celebrated Ben Ali’s fall by protesting.
February 2 ☺☹ in an emergency Parliamentary meeting, Saleh announced that he would not run again. (Great, but not enough).
February 3 ☺Despite the President’s promises, Yemenis went to the street to call for change on the Day of Rage
February 21 ☺ First tents went up around Sana’a University’s eastern gate.
February 22 ☹ 12 peaceful protesters were killed in Aden when security shot at protesters
February 23 ☺ 8 MPs of the ruling party resigned and Saleh ordered security forces to protect protesters.
February 25 ☹ two days after the President’s promise, thugs opened fire on protesters killing four
March 3 ☺ opposition groups agreed on a transition plan which they would offer Saleh
March 4 ☹ Saleh rejected opposition’s offer
March 18 ☹ At least 52 people were killed and over 200 injured when snipers shot at peaceful protesters in Sana’a
March 21 ☹☺ General Ali Mohsen joined the protests. While it was seen as a sign that the revolution will succeed, it was accepted with extreme uneasiness by many.
March 22 ??? Saleh stated two things: 1) that he would be willing to step down by the end of the year as part of a "constitutional transfer of power," but also issued a statement saying that he considered the protests to be a
"coup" and that a civil war would eventually ensue if protests continued
March 23 ☹ parliament enacted a thirty-day emergency law which suspended the constitution, allowed media censorship, banned street protests and gave security forces far-reaching powers to arrest and detain suspects.
March 24 ☺ Saleh accepted the opposition's transition plan (after he had rejected it 20 days earlier)
March 25 ☹ One day later, Saleh announced at a public appearance that he won't to step down but will seek dialogue with anti-government protesters and make concessions
March 28 ☺☹ Closed door meetings between Saleh, Ali Mohsen, opposition and the US discussing plan that he would hand over power to the vice president and formation of a new government
April 4 ☹ security on rooftops fired at protesters in Taiz killing 12 demonstrators and wounding 30
April 8 ??? Saleh rejected GCC bid.
April 23 ☺☹ Saleh announced he accepted the GCC plan
April 24 ??? Saleh announced on BBC that he would only leave through the ballot box.
April 25 ☺☹ Opposition accepted GCC plan
April 27 ☹ A leading opposition figure, announced GCC plan will be formalized on May 2 or sooner. Same day, security forces shot at protesters killing 12 and injuring over 100.
April 28 ☹ Saleh announced he will have reservations about signing if Qatar representatives are present among the Gulf foreign ministers.
April 30 ☹ Secretary General of GCC arrived in Sana'a to deliver the initiative to Saleh for him to sign later in the day. With invitations sent to all sides to attend signing ceremony Sunday in Riyadh. The morning of this day, heavy violence by security against protesters in Aden.
=====
With these political ups and downs can you blame us for being cautious with our feelings. We can’t be too excited about any prospects until we see real action and not just promises.
p.s. if you believe any of these dates are incorrect please let me know.
The diagram was created after compiling a selection of important dates, mostly political, in the last three months, and designating how they made me feel: happy, sad, or in between. The dates I highlighted below do not encompass all important events, but they are just a selection of few to get an idea of the roller coaster we call Yemeni politics. (key: 2 happy, 1 in between, 0 unhappy)
Summary of the emotional roller coaster
January 15 ☺ Yemenis celebrated Ben Ali’s fall by protesting.
February 2 ☺☹ in an emergency Parliamentary meeting, Saleh announced that he would not run again. (Great, but not enough).
February 3 ☺Despite the President’s promises, Yemenis went to the street to call for change on the Day of Rage
February 21 ☺ First tents went up around Sana’a University’s eastern gate.
February 22 ☹ 12 peaceful protesters were killed in Aden when security shot at protesters
February 23 ☺ 8 MPs of the ruling party resigned and Saleh ordered security forces to protect protesters.
February 25 ☹ two days after the President’s promise, thugs opened fire on protesters killing four
March 3 ☺ opposition groups agreed on a transition plan which they would offer Saleh
March 4 ☹ Saleh rejected opposition’s offer
March 18 ☹ At least 52 people were killed and over 200 injured when snipers shot at peaceful protesters in Sana’a
March 21 ☹☺ General Ali Mohsen joined the protests. While it was seen as a sign that the revolution will succeed, it was accepted with extreme uneasiness by many.
March 22 ??? Saleh stated two things: 1) that he would be willing to step down by the end of the year as part of a "constitutional transfer of power," but also issued a statement saying that he considered the protests to be a
"coup" and that a civil war would eventually ensue if protests continued
March 23 ☹ parliament enacted a thirty-day emergency law which suspended the constitution, allowed media censorship, banned street protests and gave security forces far-reaching powers to arrest and detain suspects.
March 24 ☺ Saleh accepted the opposition's transition plan (after he had rejected it 20 days earlier)
March 25 ☹ One day later, Saleh announced at a public appearance that he won't to step down but will seek dialogue with anti-government protesters and make concessions
March 28 ☺☹ Closed door meetings between Saleh, Ali Mohsen, opposition and the US discussing plan that he would hand over power to the vice president and formation of a new government
April 4 ☹ security on rooftops fired at protesters in Taiz killing 12 demonstrators and wounding 30
April 8 ??? Saleh rejected GCC bid.
April 23 ☺☹ Saleh announced he accepted the GCC plan
April 24 ??? Saleh announced on BBC that he would only leave through the ballot box.
April 25 ☺☹ Opposition accepted GCC plan
April 27 ☹ A leading opposition figure, announced GCC plan will be formalized on May 2 or sooner. Same day, security forces shot at protesters killing 12 and injuring over 100.
April 28 ☹ Saleh announced he will have reservations about signing if Qatar representatives are present among the Gulf foreign ministers.
April 30 ☹ Secretary General of GCC arrived in Sana'a to deliver the initiative to Saleh for him to sign later in the day. With invitations sent to all sides to attend signing ceremony Sunday in Riyadh. The morning of this day, heavy violence by security against protesters in Aden.
=====
With these political ups and downs can you blame us for being cautious with our feelings. We can’t be too excited about any prospects until we see real action and not just promises.
p.s. if you believe any of these dates are incorrect please let me know.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)