Tuesday, October 30, 2012
Sunday, October 14, 2012
Time for Hadi to move beyond managing power struggles
First published in the Guardian's Comment is Free
With the support of the international community, President
Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi came to power in Yemen as the consensus candidate
– when the opposition coalition and the former ruling party signed an
agreement on political transition put forward by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC).
After months of turmoil, the agreement ended the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh but it marginalised a large segment of Yemeni society, including those who led the movement for change.
Hadi's "election" in February – in a national poll where he was the only candidate – did not sit well with many, but others welcomed it as a symbolic step to steer Yemen away from a potential civil war.
Some of Hadi's initial decrees surprised critics, giving people hope that he would lead Yemen independently. His decisions to reassign military and security officials from their posts, and his appointments – such as replacing the governor of Taiz – were widely welcomed.
Also, on 22 September he signed a decree authorising the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations during the 2011 uprising – though with the immunity law, the chances of prosecution are near impossible.
The immunity law, stipulated in the GCC agreement, is not the only obstacle. A continuing problem is that the GCC's transition agreement places a lot of importance on President Hadi, without any reference to what would happen in his absence. Analysts worry that this makes him an easy target for those who would benefit from derailing the transitional process.
Fearing for his life, Hadi has been protected by the military's First Armoured Division (FAD) which supported opposition protests against Saleh last year. The head of the FAD, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (a kinsman of ex-president Saleh who eventually turned against him) is known for his bloody past, making him more valuable as a friend than an enemy.
Hadi's relationship with Ali Mohsen is seen by many as one of convenience, where protection is exchanged for loyalty, and there are some worrying indicators that Ali Mohsen may be gaining influence through President Hadi's tacit and sometimes declared approval.
For example, people welcomed the creation of a new Presidential Protection Force made up of three brigades of the Republican Guard, headed by Saleh's son Ahmed Ali – and one brigade from the FAD – as essential first steps towards unifying the military.
However, the 314th brigade of the FAD that was affected by this decree was one that had refused to defect with Ali Mohsen during the uprising and always remained loyal to Saleh. Hence, this decree only reduced the power of Saleh loyalists, leaving intact Ali Mohsen's influence over the military.
The Hadi-Mohsen relationship instilled fear in people that the patronage system – one of the hallmarks of Saleh's rule – may continue under a different guise in favour of the Islamist party Islah, the dominant force in the traditional opposition, due to its close ties with Ali Mohsen.
According to reports by local newspapers, employees at the ministry of electricity filed an official complaint against the minister for employing his relatives and friends without merit. They listed 19 new employees all of whom are affiliated to Islah.
One government employee stated on condition of anonymity: "In the past, the minister would only employ his pro-regime friends. Today, the new minister brought his friends from the party to take over the leadership of some divisions without the required skills. It's like one mafia replaced another."
These practices might affect Hadi's credibility and thus affect the goals of the National Dialogue, which is one crucial test for the president.
Among other things, the dialogue intended to begin next month needs to build trust with the rebellious Houthis in the north and the separatists in the south. It is of vital importance for Hadi to address their grievances and include these marginalised yet powerful groups in the process for a successful dialogue.
So far, no members of the important technical committee for the National Dialogue are affiliated to the Southern Movement, though there is talk of the state issuing a public apology for past wars in the south and north – which may restore trust in the process and facilitate their involvement.
A widespread perception, though, is that the National Dialogue will only empower political parties and will neglect the people and their needs.
Last month, Hadi issued another decree to add six new members to the technical committee, four of whom are from the Islah party, shifting the balance. It also decreased the number of women to less than 30%, which has been commonly accepted as the minimum quota for women's participation in the various committees.
For Yemen to move forward, a sincere healing process needs to begin, and a bottom-up approach needs to replace the top-down elite model for the dialogue to succeed or else it will become just another political conference. If the National Dialogue fails, so will Hadi's legitimacy.
Another indicator that the leadership is not taking people's opinions into account is Hadi's recent statement praising the efficiency of drones and acknowledging his approval of the strikes which have resulted in many civilian deaths.
With no mention of the civilian casualties from his home province of Abyan, Hadi's legitimacy is slowly fading. A backlash against his statement was immediately felt in the country.
After his speech, Hadi quickly acquired new nicknames including "Abdu Drone Hadi", coined by activist Abdulrahman Alansy. "Exchanging local support with international glamour rather than striking balance between both will simply turn him into a Yemeni version of the weak and ineffective Karzai," said Ibrahim Mothana, youth activist and co-founder of the al-Watan party.
More than seven months into his presidency, it appears that Hadi is not interested in bargaining with the masses, and instead is focused on pleasing the inner political circle, extending the exclusionary politics of the Saleh era into the new transitional government.
Hadi should take on this historic responsibility with a vision for the country and move beyond managing the power struggles, which is what Saleh did for 33 years and which cost him the presidency. With all the difficulties Yemen is facing, it is not to his advantage to sideline revolutionaries and other important and powerful groups in Yemen, from whom he should gain his legitimacy.
Gone are the days when legitimacy only comes from a small inner circle. The extent to which the people are able to push for reforms will demonstrate whether Yemen will move towards a more inclusive political process.
After months of turmoil, the agreement ended the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh but it marginalised a large segment of Yemeni society, including those who led the movement for change.
Hadi's "election" in February – in a national poll where he was the only candidate – did not sit well with many, but others welcomed it as a symbolic step to steer Yemen away from a potential civil war.
Some of Hadi's initial decrees surprised critics, giving people hope that he would lead Yemen independently. His decisions to reassign military and security officials from their posts, and his appointments – such as replacing the governor of Taiz – were widely welcomed.
Also, on 22 September he signed a decree authorising the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations during the 2011 uprising – though with the immunity law, the chances of prosecution are near impossible.
The immunity law, stipulated in the GCC agreement, is not the only obstacle. A continuing problem is that the GCC's transition agreement places a lot of importance on President Hadi, without any reference to what would happen in his absence. Analysts worry that this makes him an easy target for those who would benefit from derailing the transitional process.
Fearing for his life, Hadi has been protected by the military's First Armoured Division (FAD) which supported opposition protests against Saleh last year. The head of the FAD, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (a kinsman of ex-president Saleh who eventually turned against him) is known for his bloody past, making him more valuable as a friend than an enemy.
Hadi's relationship with Ali Mohsen is seen by many as one of convenience, where protection is exchanged for loyalty, and there are some worrying indicators that Ali Mohsen may be gaining influence through President Hadi's tacit and sometimes declared approval.
For example, people welcomed the creation of a new Presidential Protection Force made up of three brigades of the Republican Guard, headed by Saleh's son Ahmed Ali – and one brigade from the FAD – as essential first steps towards unifying the military.
However, the 314th brigade of the FAD that was affected by this decree was one that had refused to defect with Ali Mohsen during the uprising and always remained loyal to Saleh. Hence, this decree only reduced the power of Saleh loyalists, leaving intact Ali Mohsen's influence over the military.
The Hadi-Mohsen relationship instilled fear in people that the patronage system – one of the hallmarks of Saleh's rule – may continue under a different guise in favour of the Islamist party Islah, the dominant force in the traditional opposition, due to its close ties with Ali Mohsen.
According to reports by local newspapers, employees at the ministry of electricity filed an official complaint against the minister for employing his relatives and friends without merit. They listed 19 new employees all of whom are affiliated to Islah.
One government employee stated on condition of anonymity: "In the past, the minister would only employ his pro-regime friends. Today, the new minister brought his friends from the party to take over the leadership of some divisions without the required skills. It's like one mafia replaced another."
These practices might affect Hadi's credibility and thus affect the goals of the National Dialogue, which is one crucial test for the president.
Among other things, the dialogue intended to begin next month needs to build trust with the rebellious Houthis in the north and the separatists in the south. It is of vital importance for Hadi to address their grievances and include these marginalised yet powerful groups in the process for a successful dialogue.
So far, no members of the important technical committee for the National Dialogue are affiliated to the Southern Movement, though there is talk of the state issuing a public apology for past wars in the south and north – which may restore trust in the process and facilitate their involvement.
A widespread perception, though, is that the National Dialogue will only empower political parties and will neglect the people and their needs.
Last month, Hadi issued another decree to add six new members to the technical committee, four of whom are from the Islah party, shifting the balance. It also decreased the number of women to less than 30%, which has been commonly accepted as the minimum quota for women's participation in the various committees.
For Yemen to move forward, a sincere healing process needs to begin, and a bottom-up approach needs to replace the top-down elite model for the dialogue to succeed or else it will become just another political conference. If the National Dialogue fails, so will Hadi's legitimacy.
Another indicator that the leadership is not taking people's opinions into account is Hadi's recent statement praising the efficiency of drones and acknowledging his approval of the strikes which have resulted in many civilian deaths.
With no mention of the civilian casualties from his home province of Abyan, Hadi's legitimacy is slowly fading. A backlash against his statement was immediately felt in the country.
After his speech, Hadi quickly acquired new nicknames including "Abdu Drone Hadi", coined by activist Abdulrahman Alansy. "Exchanging local support with international glamour rather than striking balance between both will simply turn him into a Yemeni version of the weak and ineffective Karzai," said Ibrahim Mothana, youth activist and co-founder of the al-Watan party.
More than seven months into his presidency, it appears that Hadi is not interested in bargaining with the masses, and instead is focused on pleasing the inner political circle, extending the exclusionary politics of the Saleh era into the new transitional government.
Hadi should take on this historic responsibility with a vision for the country and move beyond managing the power struggles, which is what Saleh did for 33 years and which cost him the presidency. With all the difficulties Yemen is facing, it is not to his advantage to sideline revolutionaries and other important and powerful groups in Yemen, from whom he should gain his legitimacy.
Gone are the days when legitimacy only comes from a small inner circle. The extent to which the people are able to push for reforms will demonstrate whether Yemen will move towards a more inclusive political process.
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
Students Protest against Militarization of their University
First published in Al-Akhbar
| Students marched to President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi's house |
Students in Yemen’s capital are mobilizing to demand the end of the military presence on their campus. Their demand is proof that the people are by no means satisfied with the results of their hard-fought for revolution.
Holding colorful posters and marching besides a large megaphone, a group of young men and women were chanting for freedom. These protests symbolize the new wave of the revolution, one that is not satisfied with only a change in leadership, but demands comprehensive regime change.
“No to state security. No to the military. Free our university!” students chant in Sanaa University.
The first march was organized by the student branch of the Yemeni Socialist Party on Sunday September 17 but many students participated, including those not affiliated to any party. Since then protests have continued regularly, joined by students of various backgrounds, all rejecting the continued occupation of the university.
This call is directed at the First Armored Division (FAD), commanded by General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a one-time confidant of former president Saleh. On 21 March 2011, following the brutal sniper attack on peaceful protesters that resulted in at least 45 deaths, Ali Muhsin began siding with the protesters.
Since then a large number of FAD soldiers have been deployed around Change Square - the heart of the revolutionary movement – on the premises of protection. The square is located adjacent to the university, and hence the FAD have easy access to the educational facility.
Pro-democracy protesters at the time had mixed feelings about this move. From a strategic standpoint, it meant a formal split in the Yemeni military, which reduced possibility of a complete crush of the uprising. Some felt, however, that Ali Muhsin’s past might serve as proof that his involvement was not intended to support change, but was rather a political move for personal gains. Nevertheless, the majority accepted the decision and welcomed him chanting “Welcome, welcome FAD, and their leader Ali Muhsin.”
The FAD is still in control of the university, despite the fact that Change Square is no longer closed off, and numerous streets have opened to traffic. In addition, the protesters are no longer under direct threat from the former regime, as the new transitional government is composed of former regime and the traditional opposition (the Joint Meeting Party coalition).
Despite that, some still feel the need for protection. “I understand that they should not be here but lets be honest, the situation is still dangerous these days, and we need them to protect the students,” said Sami, a father of two, and a protester who was camped in Change Square. “Also, many scandalous things happen between boys and girls on campus. Who will control that if they are not here?” he added.
Soldiers from the FAD seem to agree that their role is merely protection, and are surprised to hear the student sentiment against them. “They are liars, there are no soldiers inside the campus, only at the gates. We are here to protect them,” said Mohammed, a soldier from the FAD who is based at the eastern entrance of Sanaa University. “Those protesting are infiltrators who have an agenda and want to create chaos. They are just politicizing this because they are socialists,” he added.
Students rebuff this statement saying that the soldiers are seen in many different parts of the campus, and not just at the gates. They allege to have seen soldiers train, to have identified military barricades and tanks in the Olympic center, in addition to two battalions behind the architecture college. They claim that photos and videos, such as this oneof soldiers training inside the university support these allegations.
Numerous students have complained of soldiers beating and detaining them. On 26 September 2012 three students were violently arrested by the FAD. “I was arrested and beaten and taken to a room inside the university. They only let me go after the students almost stormed the building,” said Hani al-Guneid, a fourth year student in the Faculty of Arts.
Guneid was beaten again on October 6 by unknown men as he was walking out of the university.
Students have complained of feeling intimidated by the soldiers at the gate. Asmahan al-Qadi, a first year agriculture student said she feels stressed every time she goes to university. “More than once the soldiers have caused me to be at least half an hour late for class due to questioning and searching my bags. When I arrive late, professors don’t understand.”
Abuse From FAD soldiers is not a new phenomenon. During the uprising, FAD soldiers beat up and detained many independent activists who criticized either al-Islah political party (the most powerful party in the opposition coalition) or the FAD and placed them in private prisons.
The mother of a current student said she is protesting for the future of her children. “We suffer from oppression and injustice at the hands of the military – even the university wasn’t left alone.”
In addition to the direct violations, students denounce military interference in student affairs. This has taken many shapes, most notably the direct interference by the head of the FAD, Ali Muhsin, in the internal affairs of the university.
This was most notably felt when an alleged letter from Ali Muhsin to the president of Sanaa University was leaked. In this document, Ali Muhsin requested the admission of a student into the university, bypassing procedures. For many students, this exemplifies his power over the university administration.
For these reasons demonstrators continue to protest against the military presence in the university. Instead of soldiers under the command of the General, students suggested that guards affiliated to the university administration replace the military.
The students have articulated these demands and have formally contacted officials in the government, but up to date no response has been given.
Security control over education institutions has a history in Yemen. During Saleh’s 33 year reign, security agencies controlled many of the universities. Yet, the revolution’s calls for a civil state gave hope for a break from the military regime. Simultaneously, the military and security apparatus occupied a number of schools during the uprising. In a 46-page report entitled,Classrooms in the Crosshairs: Military Use of Schools in Yemen’s Capital, Human Rights Watch details the occupation of schools not only by the FAD, but also by other military forces such as the Republican Guards, headed by General Ahmed Ali Saleh, and opposition militias and armed groups.
“Before the revolution, we were demanding that security agencies leave the campus, and when the revolution began we had hope but now it’s even worse, we have the military here!” said third year student Mutassem Abdulsalam with a smirk.
Despite the students’ worries and disappointment at the status quo, these protests give some students hope that the essence of the revolution is still alive.
“The student revolution to kick the military out of the campus is the first step towards regaining popular consciousness,” said political analyst Mohammed al-Maqaleh, reviving hope in the hearts of the many disappointed revolutionaries.
Holding colorful posters and marching besides a large megaphone, a group of young men and women were chanting for freedom. These protests symbolize the new wave of the revolution, one that is not satisfied with only a change in leadership, but demands comprehensive regime change.
“No to state security. No to the military. Free our university!” students chant in Sanaa University.
The first march was organized by the student branch of the Yemeni Socialist Party on Sunday September 17 but many students participated, including those not affiliated to any party. Since then protests have continued regularly, joined by students of various backgrounds, all rejecting the continued occupation of the university.
This call is directed at the First Armored Division (FAD), commanded by General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a one-time confidant of former president Saleh. On 21 March 2011, following the brutal sniper attack on peaceful protesters that resulted in at least 45 deaths, Ali Muhsin began siding with the protesters.
Since then a large number of FAD soldiers have been deployed around Change Square - the heart of the revolutionary movement – on the premises of protection. The square is located adjacent to the university, and hence the FAD have easy access to the educational facility.
Pro-democracy protesters at the time had mixed feelings about this move. From a strategic standpoint, it meant a formal split in the Yemeni military, which reduced possibility of a complete crush of the uprising. Some felt, however, that Ali Muhsin’s past might serve as proof that his involvement was not intended to support change, but was rather a political move for personal gains. Nevertheless, the majority accepted the decision and welcomed him chanting “Welcome, welcome FAD, and their leader Ali Muhsin.”
The FAD is still in control of the university, despite the fact that Change Square is no longer closed off, and numerous streets have opened to traffic. In addition, the protesters are no longer under direct threat from the former regime, as the new transitional government is composed of former regime and the traditional opposition (the Joint Meeting Party coalition).
Despite that, some still feel the need for protection. “I understand that they should not be here but lets be honest, the situation is still dangerous these days, and we need them to protect the students,” said Sami, a father of two, and a protester who was camped in Change Square. “Also, many scandalous things happen between boys and girls on campus. Who will control that if they are not here?” he added.
Soldiers from the FAD seem to agree that their role is merely protection, and are surprised to hear the student sentiment against them. “They are liars, there are no soldiers inside the campus, only at the gates. We are here to protect them,” said Mohammed, a soldier from the FAD who is based at the eastern entrance of Sanaa University. “Those protesting are infiltrators who have an agenda and want to create chaos. They are just politicizing this because they are socialists,” he added.
Students rebuff this statement saying that the soldiers are seen in many different parts of the campus, and not just at the gates. They allege to have seen soldiers train, to have identified military barricades and tanks in the Olympic center, in addition to two battalions behind the architecture college. They claim that photos and videos, such as this oneof soldiers training inside the university support these allegations.
Numerous students have complained of soldiers beating and detaining them. On 26 September 2012 three students were violently arrested by the FAD. “I was arrested and beaten and taken to a room inside the university. They only let me go after the students almost stormed the building,” said Hani al-Guneid, a fourth year student in the Faculty of Arts.
Guneid was beaten again on October 6 by unknown men as he was walking out of the university.
Students have complained of feeling intimidated by the soldiers at the gate. Asmahan al-Qadi, a first year agriculture student said she feels stressed every time she goes to university. “More than once the soldiers have caused me to be at least half an hour late for class due to questioning and searching my bags. When I arrive late, professors don’t understand.”
Abuse From FAD soldiers is not a new phenomenon. During the uprising, FAD soldiers beat up and detained many independent activists who criticized either al-Islah political party (the most powerful party in the opposition coalition) or the FAD and placed them in private prisons.
The mother of a current student said she is protesting for the future of her children. “We suffer from oppression and injustice at the hands of the military – even the university wasn’t left alone.”
In addition to the direct violations, students denounce military interference in student affairs. This has taken many shapes, most notably the direct interference by the head of the FAD, Ali Muhsin, in the internal affairs of the university.
This was most notably felt when an alleged letter from Ali Muhsin to the president of Sanaa University was leaked. In this document, Ali Muhsin requested the admission of a student into the university, bypassing procedures. For many students, this exemplifies his power over the university administration.
For these reasons demonstrators continue to protest against the military presence in the university. Instead of soldiers under the command of the General, students suggested that guards affiliated to the university administration replace the military.
The students have articulated these demands and have formally contacted officials in the government, but up to date no response has been given.
Security control over education institutions has a history in Yemen. During Saleh’s 33 year reign, security agencies controlled many of the universities. Yet, the revolution’s calls for a civil state gave hope for a break from the military regime. Simultaneously, the military and security apparatus occupied a number of schools during the uprising. In a 46-page report entitled,Classrooms in the Crosshairs: Military Use of Schools in Yemen’s Capital, Human Rights Watch details the occupation of schools not only by the FAD, but also by other military forces such as the Republican Guards, headed by General Ahmed Ali Saleh, and opposition militias and armed groups.
“Before the revolution, we were demanding that security agencies leave the campus, and when the revolution began we had hope but now it’s even worse, we have the military here!” said third year student Mutassem Abdulsalam with a smirk.
Despite the students’ worries and disappointment at the status quo, these protests give some students hope that the essence of the revolution is still alive.
“The student revolution to kick the military out of the campus is the first step towards regaining popular consciousness,” said political analyst Mohammed al-Maqaleh, reviving hope in the hearts of the many disappointed revolutionaries.
Sunday, October 7, 2012
Updated: When in doubt - seek advice
I wrote this post yesterday, and today I woke up and found an e-mail from Harvard University responding to my inquiry about the funding. They informed me that the controversial funding will not be accepted, and that they will post a document explaining this on their website in two days.
Here is the joint statement from Steven C. Caton, Professor of Contemporary Arab Studies at Harvard University and the Yemen Working Group:
Clarification on funding of the Harvard Conference on Yemen
October 7, 2012
We wish to indicate that Steven Caton is organizing the Conference “Yemen in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities” in consultation with the Yemen Working Group, and it was he who raised the funding for the conference.
It must be understood that neither Professor Caton nor Harvard University nor the Yemen Working Group that consists of professionals and academics would ever accept funding with any conditions attached that might influence either the contents of the conference or its outcomes.
Harvard University and the Yemen Working Group are dedicated to free, unbiased and open scholarly inquiry. This principle guided the way the conference was organized and is reflected in its contents. The conference is open to the public and its proceedings will be videotaped and made available on the net to the general
public.
It must also be understood that Huda Alsharifi, who was among the sponsors, never attempted to influence Professor Caton regarding the organization, contents or participation of speakers at the conference.
Various media have recently made accusations against Professor Caton, Harvard University and the Yemen Working Group that have led several participants from Yemen to withdraw from the conference unless the funding from Huda Alsharifi be returned.
In the interests of encouraging those Yemenis to reconsider their decision and after consultation with the Yemen Working Group, Professor Caton has asked Harvard University to return the funding to Huda Alsharifi and he and the YWG will seek funding from other sources.
The decision to return Alsharafi's funding is done to make it possible for the Yemeni participants to join the conference; it does not in any way give credence to the false accusations and allegations made against the conference organizers or its participants.
Steven C. Caton &
Yemen Working Group
Given this change, I have decided to participate in the conference, despite the negative media hype and the fact that many people are still upset. Thank you for all those who gave me invaluable advise. It is truly appreciated.
best,
Atiaf :)
==
As everything goes in Yemen, confusion, rumors, criticisms and lots of emotions spearhead the debate on an upcoming Conference at Harvard University entitled: Yemen in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities.
The cause of these critics: a sizable donation from Huda Al-Sharafi, a businesswoman and Yahya Mohamed Saleh's business partner. Yahya Saleh is head of the Central Security forces and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's nephew. His forces shot and killed peaceful protester.
On the Harvard page, the sponsors are listed as follows: Sponsor(s):
For many Yemenis this is a disappointing scandal. Some have interpreted this to mean that Huda Al-Sharafi is just a front for Yahya Saleh to partially fund the conference. Two days later, many local articles and facebook posts have spread rejecting this conference, and accusing the organizers and the speakers of being too close to Saleh. Other criticism was based on logistical issues and political dynamic within the Yemeni-American diaspora. In addition to concern that the Southern issue was not given the importance it deserves in the conference.
Now to explain why I'm writing this post. I am one of the speakers. My paper is entited: the War on Terror: between security and morality. The focus will be on impact of air strikes on the forgotten civilians of Yemen.
So I am torn between two thoughts:
On the one hand, i think to myself I should still go and here is why:
Here is the joint statement from Steven C. Caton, Professor of Contemporary Arab Studies at Harvard University and the Yemen Working Group:
Clarification on funding of the Harvard Conference on Yemen
October 7, 2012
We wish to indicate that Steven Caton is organizing the Conference “Yemen in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities” in consultation with the Yemen Working Group, and it was he who raised the funding for the conference.
It must be understood that neither Professor Caton nor Harvard University nor the Yemen Working Group that consists of professionals and academics would ever accept funding with any conditions attached that might influence either the contents of the conference or its outcomes.
Harvard University and the Yemen Working Group are dedicated to free, unbiased and open scholarly inquiry. This principle guided the way the conference was organized and is reflected in its contents. The conference is open to the public and its proceedings will be videotaped and made available on the net to the general
public.
It must also be understood that Huda Alsharifi, who was among the sponsors, never attempted to influence Professor Caton regarding the organization, contents or participation of speakers at the conference.
Various media have recently made accusations against Professor Caton, Harvard University and the Yemen Working Group that have led several participants from Yemen to withdraw from the conference unless the funding from Huda Alsharifi be returned.
In the interests of encouraging those Yemenis to reconsider their decision and after consultation with the Yemen Working Group, Professor Caton has asked Harvard University to return the funding to Huda Alsharifi and he and the YWG will seek funding from other sources.
The decision to return Alsharafi's funding is done to make it possible for the Yemeni participants to join the conference; it does not in any way give credence to the false accusations and allegations made against the conference organizers or its participants.
Steven C. Caton &
Yemen Working Group
Given this change, I have decided to participate in the conference, despite the negative media hype and the fact that many people are still upset. Thank you for all those who gave me invaluable advise. It is truly appreciated.
best,
Atiaf :)
==
As everything goes in Yemen, confusion, rumors, criticisms and lots of emotions spearhead the debate on an upcoming Conference at Harvard University entitled: Yemen in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities.
The cause of these critics: a sizable donation from Huda Al-Sharafi, a businesswoman and Yahya Mohamed Saleh's business partner. Yahya Saleh is head of the Central Security forces and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's nephew. His forces shot and killed peaceful protester.
On the Harvard page, the sponsors are listed as follows: Sponsor(s):
American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Ash Institute
(Harvard Kennedy School of Government), Crown Center (Brandeis
University), Dean of the Social Sciences (FAS, Harvard), Islamic Legal
Studies Program (Harvard Law School), Middle East Initiative (Harvard
Kennedy School of Government), MIT Middle East Program, Outreach Center
(Harvard Center for Middle East Studies), and Women and Public Policy
Program (Harvard Kennedy School of Government). We also would like to
thank the generous support of Huda Alsharifi.
For many Yemenis this is a disappointing scandal. Some have interpreted this to mean that Huda Al-Sharafi is just a front for Yahya Saleh to partially fund the conference. Two days later, many local articles and facebook posts have spread rejecting this conference, and accusing the organizers and the speakers of being too close to Saleh. Other criticism was based on logistical issues and political dynamic within the Yemeni-American diaspora. In addition to concern that the Southern issue was not given the importance it deserves in the conference.
Now to explain why I'm writing this post. I am one of the speakers. My paper is entited: the War on Terror: between security and morality. The focus will be on impact of air strikes on the forgotten civilians of Yemen.
So I am torn between two thoughts:
On the one hand, i think to myself I should still go and here is why:
- I would like to fly with my own funds, but since I can't at this point, I could raise some funds through crowd funding for the cost of the ticket and the hotel.
- I believe that some Harvard University graduates will go on to become policy makers, and i hope to be able to make at least one person question the current counter terrorism policy in Yemen.
- I believe that this is an academic conference that was well intentioned, and that the organizers worked hard on planning, but that one of the sponsors was not vetted appropriately. but i also believe that Yahya Saleh will not, and can not control the papers presented, nor the outcomes of the conference.
- Finally, and most importantly, I have been to Abyan. I interviewed people who had their homes destroyed, their children killed or wounded, and their hospitals attacked because of air strikes. Yemeni government and activists have ignored them. I dream about these kids, and I want to give them a voice. Their parents have asked that their stories be told and so I want to share their struggles. If this means that my "reputation" might be tarnished by some people who like to generalize and would not like to think deeply, then maybe it's a risk I should take.
- This is a matter of principal, and even if it's a good opportunity, other opportunities will present themselves.
- Even if i pay my own way there, I am giving credibility to a conference partially funded by Yahya Saleh's partner.
- Even if i raise my own funds to go, at this point, no one will even listen to what i have to say, because the reputation of the conference is tarnished.
- The media backlash against me will be high. as exemplified by one facebook status of a Yemeni-American activist who has already said on facebook: "I expect speakers to cancel their participation within 24 hours" even though we are all still waiting for official responses from Harvard about this funding.
Thursday, October 4, 2012
Yemen in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities
My presentation at Harvard University focused on civilian casualties of air strikes in Yemen
Sunday, September 30, 2012
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
We are more alike than different!
“Your
task is not to seek for love,
but merely to seek and find
all the barriers within yourself
that you have built against it.” - Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi
but merely to seek and find
all the barriers within yourself
that you have built against it.” - Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi
I remember September 11th like it was yesterday. I was a student at the American University campus in Washington D.C. As students hovered over the small television watching the twin towers fall, tears rolled down my face. “Utter cruelty” I thought to myself. More difficult was the realization that this vicious act was done by “Muslims”.
“This simply can’t be” I
thought to myself, no person of faith can deliberately kill in the name of God!
But then again, history is full of stories of “religious” Christians, Muslims,
Hindus and Jewish people killing innocent civilians in the name of “God”.
While majority of
Muslims condemned the 9/11 attacks, unfortunately many Americans continued to
view Muslims not Al-Qaeda as the enemy.
Last July, I was in
Abyan province in Yemen, and I visited families of civilian casualties of the
“War on Terror”. These families had nothing to do with Al-Qaeda or the
Yemeni military, yet US drones and Yemeni aircraft hit their homes and killed
or wounded their family members.
Hearing their stories, and seeing the
photos of those killed reminded me of that feeling I had when I saw the plane
hit the twin towers. Once again I felt horrified and thought to myself “Utter cruelty”.
The effects of the global war on terror are far reaching. No matter who the
perpetrator is, murder and death of civilians can not be justified. Every individual
that was killed unjustly should be honored, and their tragedy remembered. Simultaneously, the politics that indiscriminately
kills innocent people should be criticized. This policy is counter-productive and fuels hates and keeps societies in a cycle of violence.
The anti-American
sentiment that is rising in Yemen, reminds me of the anti-Islam sentiment that
swept and continues to spread in the U.S. These reactionary feelings are
a product of internalizing political differences and forgetting the humanity
that we share.
The policies of the “War
on Terror” are often very divisive. And helps promote hatred, and continues the
cycle of violence. The War on Terror has also made my job of
trying to “bridge the gap” between “East & West” a more difficult
one.
While I am very vocal
about my concerns regarding both the policies of the Yemeni and American
government, visa-vi the “War on Terror”, I am also very vocal that politics is
one thing, human beings are another. We should not put both in one
camp.
As a person who spent a
significant amount of my life in both worlds (US & Yemen) I find it easy to float between one or the other. In each place I
go, I attempt to deconstruct some of the images people have of the OTHER.
For example, in Yemen I
tell people stories about Muslims in America who didn’t have a mosque near by,
so members of a church offered them space to perform Friday prayer there. Then
I watch their shocked eyes. It seems what I said was jaw-dropping.
So I continue: “America is not only what you see in Hollywood movies.”
In the US, I tell people
how Yemenis love to host foreigners and despite misconceptions, majority of
Yemenis do not like AQAP. Again I see people’s jaws drop from
shock. I continue: “Yemen is not only what you read about in your news
feed”.
We can not let politicians drive us away from our shared humanity.
We need to remember that we are more alike than different. As a reminder of that, here are 10 silly facts to remind us of our similarities:
2. Both countries have very low percentage of women in Parliament/Congress. Women hold 90, or 16.8%, of the 535 seats in the 112th US Congress — 17, or 17.0%, of the 100 seats in the Senate and 73, or 16.8%, of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives.[1] In Yemen the number of women in parliament fell from 11 in 1993 to only 1 in 2003. (but there is a high chance it will increase to 30% with a quota that women are currently pushing for).
3. Both countries love their STARS. Starbuger in Yemen and Starbucks in the U.S.
4. The death penalty is legal in both countries. And large groups in the population support the death penalty, despite the efforts of human rights activists for reform.
5. Both societies have their own popular political satire show. Daily Show in the US, Aakis Khat (against the Current) in Yemen.
6. Average citizens in both countries are very friendly and very welcoming.
7. In both countries the Military Budget as percentage of GDP is very high: US its 4.060%, Yemen 6.600% [2]
8. Both societies love movies. Hollywood makes movies, Yemenis sell the latest movies in every corner, sometimes before they’re even released in the U.S.!
9. In both countries, if you have money you can get proper health care, if you don't, your screwed.
10. U.S. & Yemen both lead the world in guns (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/07/2012726141159587596.html)
We need to remember that we are more alike than different. As a reminder of that, here are 10 silly facts to remind us of our similarities:
1. Both countries have talented sportsmen with skills for high jumping.
In Yemen the camel jumping tradition, and in the US the “slam dunking”
tradition.
![]() |
| camel jumping sport, from http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/The-Sport-of-Camel-Jumping.html |
![]() |
| Slam dunking in the US |
2. Both countries have very low percentage of women in Parliament/Congress. Women hold 90, or 16.8%, of the 535 seats in the 112th US Congress — 17, or 17.0%, of the 100 seats in the Senate and 73, or 16.8%, of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives.[1] In Yemen the number of women in parliament fell from 11 in 1993 to only 1 in 2003. (but there is a high chance it will increase to 30% with a quota that women are currently pushing for).
3. Both countries love their STARS. Starbuger in Yemen and Starbucks in the U.S.
4. The death penalty is legal in both countries. And large groups in the population support the death penalty, despite the efforts of human rights activists for reform.
5. Both societies have their own popular political satire show. Daily Show in the US, Aakis Khat (against the Current) in Yemen.
6. Average citizens in both countries are very friendly and very welcoming.
7. In both countries the Military Budget as percentage of GDP is very high: US its 4.060%, Yemen 6.600% [2]
8. Both societies love movies. Hollywood makes movies, Yemenis sell the latest movies in every corner, sometimes before they’re even released in the U.S.!
9. In both countries, if you have money you can get proper health care, if you don't, your screwed.
10. U.S. & Yemen both lead the world in guns (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/07/2012726141159587596.html)
[1] Center for American
Women and Politics, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/Congress-CurrentFacts.php
Monday, September 3, 2012
Invisible Casualties of the War
First published in Al-Akhbar
According to Ali’s father, Alkhadr Ali Hassan, Doctors without Borders/Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) generously conducted 1 million Yemeni Riyal ($4,660) worth of reconstructive surgery. Yet Ali still needs a lot more. The once studious teenager dropped out of school due to depression.
“He refuses to see his classmates because he is disfigured. It’s been eight months and there is nothing I can do to help my son,” said the boy’s father. “He does not want to go to school and one time I hospitalized him because he overdosed on drugs. I believe he wanted to end his life, and it pains me to see that. I don’t know what to do,” he added.
Ali Alkhadr is not alone in a country where civilians are often caught in the middle between militants and the government. These civilians are ignored in the mainstream media and their deaths denied by governments.
Terrorism is of grave concern in Yemen, and its consequences are far reaching. On Saturday 4 August 2012, locals in Jaar were the targets of a bombing by militants that killed at least 40 people. The Yemeni and US government’s response to these attacks in Yemen has included arbitrary arrests, homes being demolished, death and injuries, and displacement of civilians.
Since January 2012, there have been over 60 US air-strikes in Yemen, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), killing hundreds of civilians.
On 15 May 2012, an air-strike, believed to be a US drone, hit a civilian home. People nearby ran to see what had happened and to help the injured inside.
“About 15 minutes later, another plane suddenly struck the same building killing 15 people, including my brother,” said 19-year old Hassan Ahmed Abdullah recounting the incident. “He was wounded by shrapnel in his chest, liver, and neck. He also had burns on 50 percent of his body.”
From scarred people to destroyed buildings, Abyan carries many testaments to the war on terror.
Most of the civilian homes in the impoverished area of al-Kod were destroyed by air-strikes and heavy artillery. This area houses some of the poorest people in Yemen.
Bombs did not only hit homes but also struck schools and even the largest hospital in Abyan, al-Razi hospital.
“The bombing of al-Razi hospital was a tragedy, and I believe we will suffer from it for years to come, especially in light of Yemen’s economic social and political deterioration,” said psychologist and Jaar resident, Wahib Saad who also stressed the psychological trauma of such attacks.
“Today, when I hear a plane I immediately run to the house” said seven-year-old Ahmed. Ahmed’s drawings and the other children’s show images of darkness, death, and destruction, indicating that the generations to come will need much more than financial compensation to recover.
While many residents of Abyan believe that US strikes are more accurate in hitting their desired targets than Yemeni ones, the majority believes that the implications of US bombing are disastrous.
This is seen from the fact that US strikes are seen as an invasion, an occupation and a breach of sovereignty. A citizen journalist who preferred to remain anonymous said to me, “Let’s be honest, I am against US intervention. The Yemeni government has the right to rely on the US for help but not when the US is using Yemenis against their own brothers. As a southern separatist, I believe that we are already under two occupations, by the North and the militants, and I don’t want a third occupation by the Americans,” he said.
US drones have not only resulted in death and destruction, but have also been counter productive to the counter-terrorism efforts, because with each casualty, militants groups gain more members.
“These attacks have negative impacts on psyches of children who keep hearing: this is America that is killing you, don’t you have the pride and courage to fight it?” said Saad.
Similarly it has enabled militants to make people question the concept of a civil democratic state. A photo of a mosque destroyed by an air-strike with “This is democracy, even mosques have been destroyed” written on its wall summarizes what people view as American ideology.
The strikes have also helped hard-line Islamists recruit members. In a pamphlet distributed by a mosque in Aden, 15 lines denounced cooperation with the US on the basis that the drones kill innocent civilians. “Oh Muslims, do you know that the Americans are now in Yemen? Who allowed them to kill our sons and brothers every day using drones?
The strikes
have increased anti-American sentiment in the country as a whole. In a
rare public demonstration in Change Square in Sanaa, some protesters
burned American flags in a protest entitled “No to American meddling.”
Despite the grave violations against citizens, the Yemeni government has
ignored the civilians and the majority of the wounded have not received
any compensation.
With no means to seek justice or redress for the unlawful attacks,
young brothers, friends and relatives of those killed become easy
targets for militant recruitment. “I will even join Satan if I have to
in order to get revenge for my wounded seven year old son,” said one angered
father from Jaar who preferred to remain anonymous.
The Yemeni government is a partner in these targeted strikes. Former President Saleh gave the US open access to Yemen’s air space to be used for air-strikes against AQAP. This policy continues today under the new transitional government, even with the presence of the former opposition, who previously called against these airstrikes.
Despite the high number of civilian casualties due to air-strikes, many leading politicians and activists, including Nobel Peace Prize winner, Tawakkul Karman, have not advocated on their behalf.
While we were sitting in the field clinic in Jaar, Wahib Saad asked a young boy: “what do you want to be when you grow up?” The boy answered with utter silence. “See, he doesn’t have a dream” commented Dr. Saad, “I remember when I was his age I wanted to be a pilot. If this child has no dream, then we are a country with no hope.”
The Yemeni government is a partner in these targeted strikes. Former President Saleh gave the US open access to Yemen’s air space to be used for air-strikes against AQAP. This policy continues today under the new transitional government, even with the presence of the former opposition, who previously called against these airstrikes.
Despite the high number of civilian casualties due to air-strikes, many leading politicians and activists, including Nobel Peace Prize winner, Tawakkul Karman, have not advocated on their behalf.
While we were sitting in the field clinic in Jaar, Wahib Saad asked a young boy: “what do you want to be when you grow up?” The boy answered with utter silence. “See, he doesn’t have a dream” commented Dr. Saad, “I remember when I was his age I wanted to be a pilot. If this child has no dream, then we are a country with no hope.”
Tuesday, August 14, 2012
The Veil, Self Expression, and Identity
Last month, I flew from Sana’a airport wearing a bright green scarf. On the plane I encountered the same awkward moment I always face: when and how do I take off my scarf? [In Yemen I cover my hair not because of any legal obligation, but because it is the custom].
I scanned the area and then I did what I usually do, waited until it naturally slipped off and then I kept it on my shoulder until I left the plane. After that, I folded the scarf and put it in my suitcase.
Some of my feminist friends say this is hypocritical and wish that I would just pick one way or the other. But as a feminist myself, I don't see why I should only stick to one "look". I think this flexibility is a testament to the degree that we, Middle Eastern women can adapt.
Regardless of people's perceptions, I want to say loudly and clearly that with or without it, I am still me.
![]() |
| One person, different looks |
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
"A dream you dream together is reality"
"A dream you dream alone is only a dream. A dream you dream together is reality." John Lennon
In dreams, we are gifted with super powers, and with the ability to do extraordinary things. The euphoria one gets from mass mobilization gives us the same feeling. It allows us to dream that the impossible is possible. Armed with only this belief, we continue to demand justice and change, believing that nothing will stop us.
At the start of the revolution in February 2011, I had very high expectations, and despite my usual over analysing personality, I did not allow any negative energy to seep in.
In April 2011, when some unexpected forces, such as General Ali Muhsin "joined" the pro-democracy movement, and when certain elements of the opposition imposed their intolerance on others, the colors in my dream started to fade.
Today, after many high hopes have been crushed, I dream only in black and white.
I still believe in the power of the people to do amazing things, but I also believe that the extraordinary will take time to become a reality. Long term change requires a long journey.
Like a video game, this journey is filled with many challenges (poverty, lack of security, foreign and regional interferences, airstrikes, corruption etc), but hopefully we can reach our ultimate goal.
In that long journey, I hope that I never reach the point where I stop dreaming. But if I find myself stuck in a constant nightmare, I ask you to please wake me up.
Like a video game, this journey is filled with many challenges (poverty, lack of security, foreign and regional interferences, airstrikes, corruption etc), but hopefully we can reach our ultimate goal.
In that long journey, I hope that I never reach the point where I stop dreaming. But if I find myself stuck in a constant nightmare, I ask you to please wake me up.
![]() |
| Protester at change square holding a sign that reads: "We don't ask for much..we only dream of change" |
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)



