It's not a Sunni- Shi’a Conflict, dummy!

Last week, my young cousin in the second grade ran inside after an explosion shook the windows. “I don’t mind when the house shakes, I just don’t want to die in it,” he said out of breath. “You won’t.” I reassured him. He then went back to play. I followed him outside to find a group of children playing a political game: President Hadi v. Abdulmalik Al-Houthi. Their mission was to free the cats held hostage. As I sat there watching this game unfold, I heard them throw many terms around: democracy, justice, national dialogue conference etc. The words Sunni or Shi’a, were never mentioned.

This is not surprising given the fact that affiliation to a madhab (religious school of thought) rarely comes up in conversations in Yemen. This is slowly changing, and many fear that this historic diversity and tolerance might become something of the past.

To say there are no sectarian tendencies or cleavages in Yemen is incorrect (as Dr. Shelagh Weir explained from the 1980s), but the oversimplification of explaining the current power struggle entirely on historic theological differences between Sunnis and Shi’as is incorrect as well.

This is incorrect for a variety of reasons that I will summarize here.

First, while no statistics have been collected on the composition of Ansarullah, commonly known as Houthis; it is believed that many of their members are Zaydi but also come from various religious schools of thought in Shi’a and Sunni Islam, including Ismaili, Shafiʿi, and Ja’afari. Many Sunni tribesmen and soldiers have also joined the Houthis and fight along their side. In fact, prominent Shafi’i leaders like Saad Bin Aqeel, a Mufti of Ta’iz, are amongst Houthis’ leaders and in fact presented a Friday sermon at one of the sit-ins prior to their advance into the capital.

Second, Zaydis share similar doctrines and jurisprudential opinions with Sunni scholars. As Helen Lackner, author of Why Yemen Matters? stated “this has little, if anything, to do with theological differences or a Sunni/Shi’a split, but is based on issues of social cohesion, including tribal allegiance, power, control and (the absence of) development and social security funding for an increasingly impoverished and suffering population.”

Third, socially speaking Yemenis have lived and continue to live together without segregation. Muslims in Yemen, from the various schools of thought, whether Sunni or Shi’a, pray side-by-side, people intermarry without any special procedures or “conversions,” and communal violence based on confessional membership has been rare.

Fourth, according to Houthis’ their actions do not aim “exclusively or even primarily at establishing a Zaydi political order” as Stacey Phillbrick Yadav, Associate Professor and author of “Islamists and the State: Legitimacy and Institutions in Yemen and Lebanon” states. She adds, “Similarly, the fact that Islah’s membership is predominantly Sunni doesn’t mean it is working to reestablish the caliphate.”

Fifth, not all Zaydis are Houthis. Well-known Zaydi scholars and religious centers have been divided on their stance towards the Houthis.

Sixth, missing from the analysis is the link between rural deprivation and wider political contestations, and conflicts. The longer the transitional government ignored people’s grievances, the more the ranks of the discontented swelled. Last straw was when the government lifted the fuel subsidies overnight without warning in 29 July 2014, increasing the price of fuel and diesel by 60 and 90 percent. Mass protests erupted, and Houthis capitalized on these grievances, and by so doing, gained a significant number of new membership from various bacgrounds (not only Zaydis) which helped them expand.

Seventh, while sectarian cleavages are becoming exploited by various groups, such as when al-Qaeda uses the rise of Houthis to recruit more people to defend “the Sunnis," it is important to remember that those fighting al-Qaeda are not all Shi’a nor are they all Houthis.

Eigth, if this was a sectarian issue, Saleh (who is technically Zaydi) would not have engaged in six wars with the Houthis from 2004 - 2010. It appears that today’s former enemies have formed a temporary alliance.  This indicates that these conflicts are political in nature.

Ninth, there is no sectarian dimension to the victims of the violations by the Houthis such as the detention of activists and journalists in recent protests.

Finally, while the geopolitical tensions between the various political camps of course impacts what is happening on the ground, it is incorrect to explain the political dynamics in the country as simply foreign interference. In addition, narrowly framing the ongoing issue as sectarian absolves the transitional government from their duties as it helps them blame everything on foreign actors, rather than making them accountable for the localized grievances found throughout the majority of Yemen. It also absolves Houthis from the violations they have committed blaming their actions on theological differences instead of political aspirations.

As these ten points demonstrate, the issue cannot be reduced to a theological war. Analysis must include these nuances in order to better understand the ongoing political dynamics. Without a proper understanding, policies will continue to be flawed and no solutions will be formulated, which would perpetuate the cycle of violence.

Yemen's 'Muwaladeen': The struggle for equal citizenship-

First Published in Al-Jazeera English 

Yemenis who are born to foreign parents face institutional discrimination because of their perceived lack of 'purity'.

A Yemeni activist and I were talking while walking in downtown Sana'a one hot morning. An old man kept turning back to look at us and eventually asked him with curiosity: "where are you from?" my colleague simply responded with a smile. "Ethiopia, Somalia?" asked the old man.

Anyone who has navigated the streets of Yemen will ultimately experience the friendly curiosity of its inhabitants. People are often inquisitive, welcoming, and honest. Political "correctness" does not exist here.

So the question that the man asked can be seen as an example of this curiosity. Yet for 37-year old Khaled Shanoon, who was born in Sana'a to a Yemeni father from Mareb province and an Eritrean mother, questions like these are often accompanied by negative connotations and memories of numerous incidents of discrimination.

Despite the long history of Yemeni traders travelling abroad, immigrating, and forming cross-cultural families, the term "Muwalad" is still used today to describe children born to one parent of another nationality.

The term itself is defined in an Arabic dictionary as "an Arab who is not purely Arab." While the term applies to children of Yemeni-Russian, Yemeni-Vietnamese, or Yemeni-Egyptian couples, it is most often used for children of an African parent or a parent with African descent. According to an article by activist Hussein Musleh this term is used for humiliation, as a way to remind the person that he/she is not "pure" Yemeni.

Such attitudes are exacerbated by today's obsession with light or white skin in the Arab region, which is in sharp contrast to the famous poetry and music where artists and poets wrote and sang about tan women.

Today, Arabic satellite channels broadcast the very negative "Fair and Lovely" commercial, that insinuates that the darker you are, the less successful/beautiful you are.

Unfortunately, in Yemen such attitudes to skin colour have recently moved from bad TV commercials to state institutions through the passing of the a decree on citizenship rights.

Relationship between Yemen and the Horn of Africa

Arabian-African relations date back to ancient times, when the kingdom of Axum, ruled both the southern Arabian Peninsula and Ethiopia (also called Abyssinia). Because of the two civilizstions' integration over the years, intermarriage resulted in Yemeni and Ethiopian mixed blood.

In modern times, Yemen provided a safe haven for Ethiopian refugees and Ethiopia in turn accepted Yemeni immigrants during times of political upheaval or seeking a better economic future. For example, many Yemenis remained in Ethiopia since Italy's 1936 invasion, when they were brought by the Italians to work as builders and became rich.

Dr Hussein Fouly, an Ethiopian researcher specialising in Yemeni-Ethiopian relations explained that Yemenis and Ethiopians intermixed first because of "Yemenis' ability to integrate and second, because of the Ethiopian civilisation's welcoming attitude toward foreigners in their land throughout the 20th century".

Strangers here and there

Children of Yemeni immigrants who have returned from the horn of Africa often share positive memories of nations that treated them well. Yet despite how welcoming many were, some complain that they never felt either purely "African" or purely "Yemeni".

Locals in both countries often treat them as citizens of the other country. They have deep connections in both places but do not fully belong to either country. "When I'm in Djibouti I'm called the Yemeni, and when I'm in Yemen, I'm referred to as the Djibouti," said a 26- year old artist with whom I spoke recently.

This lack of belonging is a common feeling that many children of mixed backgrounds feel around the world. The late novelist Mohammad Abdul-Wali, a Yemeni diplomat and a prominent writer of Ethiopian descent who died in 1973, tried to portray these feelings in his novel They Die Strangers where he wrote: "Yes it is us, we are in search of a nation, of citizens, of hope. You do not know how it feels to be a stranger."

Social and cultural discrimination

Yemeni citizens with links to the Horn of Africa often face cultural and legal discrimination on a daily basis in Yemen. Whether it is the name calling they encounter at schools, the obstacles they face when wanting to marry a "pure" Yemeni, or the daily struggles to convince authorities of their "Yemeniness".

If they can, a majority of children and adults hide the fact that one of their parents is from the Horn of Africa because of the "shame" or ridicule it could bring them. AT the same time, children from a Russian or Western parent would often boast about their "beautifully light" family.

"I ignored my grandmother for ten years when I was young, I wanted to disassociate myself from her," remembers Khaled sadly. "When I grew up, I visited her in Eritrea and quickly felt ashamed of my actions as a child. She's an incredibly kind woman. I wish I could write a letter to all the African mothers to apologise that we were once embarrassed from them," he added.

Khaled has transformed his regret into a positive campaign by creating the first NGO in Yemen, Sons of Immigrant's Organisation, which seeks to promote equal citizenship by highlighting discrimination against the Muwaladeen and demanding equal rights.

Government responsibility

While cultural and social discrimination are unfortunately found around the world, many Muwaladeen feel that discrimination complaints often fall on deaf ears. In fact, Muwaladeen accuse government officials of institutionalising this racism.

Many complain that the state often neglects them and only uses them before an election. "Yemen only recognises us when they need our voice in the election, which means we are Yemeni citizens for only two days in seven years," wrote Ali Salem in article published in Al-Hayat newspaper.

These Muwaladeen are often denied identity cards or passports by officials arguing that they do not have sufficient "evidence" to prove their "Yemeniness" due to their darker skin and sometimes-imperfect Arabic. They are also sometimes looked at as "newcomers" in the country they were born and raised in, and hence treated as such.

Recently, this type of discrimination was legalised. On March 3, 2014 a decree was passed by the Civil Status Authority, which stated:

Copy of decree by the Civil Status Athority

"1) It is strictly forbidden to grant identity cards for Muwaladeen born outside Yemen, especially to those born in the Horn of Africa, who do not have proof of Yemeni nationality. 2) Excluded from this, are Muwaladeen born in the Gulf countries, Europe and Asia, provided that their parents are born in Yemen…"

While it goes without saying that proof of citizenship should in fact be a requirement to obtain an identification card, the mere fact that the decree differentiates between people from the Horn of Africa and others, illustrates the innate racism in government institutions against "black" people.

On January 25, 2014, Yemen's National Dialogue Conference concluded and resulted in a 300-page document filled with recommendations, many of which emphasise demands of equal citizenship and justice.For example, recommendation number four of the state-building working group states, "All citizens shall be equal in rights and duties before the law, without distinction based on sex, race, origin, colour, religion, sect, doctrine, opinion, or economic or social standing."

Yet the recent decree that was passed after the end of the NDC makes citizens worry that these recommendations will merely remain ink on paper.

Yemen's "Airplanes of the Sick"

Photo of a Yemeni hospital, via http://al-shorfa.com/ar/articles/meii/features/2012/12/07/feature-01

"Airplane of the Sick" is what employees at Cairo Airport call the Yemenia plane that arrives from Yemen. Why? because on that plane, there are often a number of sick people arriving for medical treatment.

Anyone who flew on Yemenia, from Yemen to either Cairo or Jordan will notice the high number of sick patients on the plane, some even laying down in critical condition. On several occasions, patients have died on the plane.

Despite the progress Yemen has made to expand its health care system, it remains severely underdeveloped and therefore many try to seek medical treatment abroad.

Of course the rich can afford to travel to the Gulf, Europe and the U.S. for yearly checkups and medical examinations. In fact, former President Saleh himself had to fly out of the country when the Presidential palace was attacked and he was severely wounded. In the 33 years of his rule, his regime did not even invest in one decent hospital where he could have went for treatment!

The "lucky" ones in Yemen, manage to borrow money or sell what they can to travel to India, Jordan, Egypt or sometimes Lebanon for medical treatment.

However, for the majority of society, clinics and hospitals are rare, overcrowded and expensive. In fact, only 25 percent of rural areas (where majority of population resides) have health services as compared to 80 percent of urban areas.

Even basic cases such as giving birth can be deadly in Yemen. It is unbelievable for example that eight women die giving birth every day.

Most people have to travel quite a distance to get to a clinic or hospital. When they do, it is often extremely expensive. With no health insurance, if a life threatening disease infects someone, or an accident occurs, people have to either borrow money to pay for the expenses, or accept the harsh reality that they can not afford the treatment and therefore must wait to die.

My relative was lucky, she has a large family who helped with her expenses. Six months ago, Ina'am, a young school administrator in her late 20's suddenly became sick. When she went to get a blood test she fell in a coma for a couple of months. When she woke up, she could not speak or move, but she was aware of her surroundings. The doctors could not identify the cause of the problem, and therefore, as is often the case, they recommended that she seek treatment abroad.

After sending her medical file to India and Egypt (where costs are relatively affordable and there are no problems with visas for Yemenis) doctors there did not accept her case. Doctors in Saudi Arabia accepted her case but she could not get a visa. Then finally, a hospital in Jordan accepted her case, and because Yemenis do not need a visa, she was able to go there. Her family borrowed money and sold some things so they could afford to pay for two round-trip tickets, housing rental, and of course medical costs.

When they arrived in Jordan, the doctors examined her and said in front of her (she was conscious and could hear): "why did you bring her here? this is pointless! did you bring her to die in Jordan or what?!"

This careless cruel way of speaking was extremely hurtful, disrespectful and unprofessional. Ina'am returned to Yemen and miraculously got better, she even began speaking. Little did we know that it was the body's way of rejuvenating itself to allow her to say goodbye to the family. She passed away three days ago without a proper diagnosis.

In our efforts to promote change in Yemen, lets not only focus on political rights, but also on basic rights such as demanding our right for affordable and accessible health care.

on the 3rd anniversary of the Revolution - can there be peace without justice?

First published in Aljazeera English

In 2011, the colorful tents of Change Square flourished with hope and a dream of a dignified life. Three years later, like the tents, hope of regime change has disappeared for many independent revolutionaries.

While many positive steps have been taken in the past three years, including the official removal of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power, the creation of a transitional unity government, and the completion of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a complete break with the past is yet to be seen.

On February 21, 2012 on the first anniversary of the Yemeni Revolution, an uncontested "election" brought Saleh's vice president to power, based on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)'s power transfer agreement. This deal, signed on November 23, 2011, was a great blow to the independent revolutionaries, as it empowered traditional forces over those calling for radical change and cosmetically addressed their demands.

In 2011, prior to this agreement, the regime, that had once neglected the youth, was forced to interact with them, due to their street power, which expanded political bargaining beyond the traditional political elite. Yet the GCC blocked this process, emphasising instead traditional patronage politics.

Business as usual

The demands of the street extended beyond the removal of the president to include comprehensive change to the entire political structure, which has been the cause of marginalisation. Many independent youth felt that the traditional opposition figures who worked side by side with the old regime do not believe in real change and have co-opted the revolution for personal and political gains.

Creating a national unity government, while politically a positive move, meant that both traditional opposition and former ruling party members are in charge of government positions, transpiring in recruitment of government employees based on party loyalties rather than expertise. This marginalised a number of independent qualified technocrats, leaving management of many ministries to those who had no proper knowledge and blocking any reform of government institution, which is a necessary step to break away from the past.

Furthermore, the 2014 budget [Ar] allocated $11.3m to the Tribes' Affairs Authority, which will be spent on monthly salaries for tribal leaders. In comparison, as the Yemen Times highlighted, the budget projected for Yemen's Coast Guard Authority is $7.2m.

The fact that this line item remains in the budget post-revolution demonstrates that the transitional government is not keen on moving away from the patronage system towards a modern civic state on the basis of equal citizenship, social justice, and a plural political system.

According to a Parliamentary report [Ar], the same budget did not allocate any funds for the implementation of the NDC recommendations. This has made it difficult for people to trust the government's political will to move forward with the decisions.

The NDC brought together 565 members from various backgrounds; seven percent of the seats were allocated to independent youth. The 300-page NDC recommendations [Ar] are significant, and emphasize revolutionary demands of equal citizenship and justice. For example, The forth recommendation of the state-building working group states, "All citizens shall be equal in rights and duties before the law, without distinction based on sex, race, origin, colour, religion, sect, doctrine, opinion, or economic or social standing." Yet the fear is that such recommednations will remain simply ink on paper, and like many laws in Yemen will not be implemented.

While NDC members claimed that these recommendations are "binding", there is no legislative provision that obliges either the government or the outdated parliament to carry them out.

In fact, many do not believe that these recommendations will in fact be implemented, pointing to the "20 points" as an example. Prior to the start of the NDC, the technical committee created to organise the NDC publically recommended a list of 20 points that are meant to rebuild trust between the South, the Houthis, and the government. This was supposed to be completed prior to the NDC, yet even after the end of the NDC, only a few of these points have been implemented. This begs the question: If these simple 20 points cannot be implemented, what will become of the remaining 300 page worth of recommendations?

Another example of lack of implementation lies in the absence of proper compensation for the injured revolutionaries. Despite a presidential decree ordering their treatment, many of them have been neglected and the government has provided little financial and medical support for them.

On February 9 Abdul Jabar al-Namer, a protester who was shot in the stomach in 2011 died waiting to travel abroad for further medical treatment. Unhappy with this situation, the youth have staged numerous protests and demonstrations in support of their injured fellows, and some of the wounded have gone on hunger strikes. Despite promises to address the situation, no serious action has yet been taken. To date, four lawsuits have been filed by injured revolutionaries and their families, yet there has been no change in the status quo.

Increasing violence

Although the presidential decrees aimed at restructuring the military were bold in their gaols, personal loyalties still control the army. In fact, Human Rights Watch reported that President Hadi informed them that "a general issue with the Yemeni military is that each brigade is formed from the same tribe." In his words, it is impossible to "remove a commander who commits an abuse because the commander will simply reject the decision and the brigade will stand by him."

This might explain why the committee setup by President Hadi to investigate the military attack on a funeral of a member of the Southern Movement in al-Dali last December has not yet provided any explanation or charged anyone. This lack of accountability is a natural consequence of the immunity law that provided protection for members of the former regime and enshrined this culture of impunity.

Violence by security institutions has continued against peaceful protesters, even on the anniversary of President Hadi's "election". On February 21, security forces shot at a large rally in Aden where peopledemonstrated against the outcomes of the NDC and called for secession. At the same time in the North, violent clashes between the Houthis, Salafis and tribal militias have persisted over the past months.

The NDC clearly did not succeed in addressing the main issues in the South or in the North.

There is no doubt that real change will take many years, yet the foundations need to be built correctly. With no real reform of government institutions, no rule of law, deteriorating economy and a catastrophic humanitarian situation, conflicts throughout Yemen have dramatically increased. Three years after the Yemeni revolution, we are left asking ourselves: Can the Yemen model really succeed? And can there be peace without justice?

Yemen: Transition and turmoil Three years after the revolution,

Guess appearance on the Stream discussing:
 how can the country deal with concerns over stability and security?

The birth and death of cinema in Aden

This article was first published in Aljazeera English

Every day, Mohammed Afeef, a native of Aden, skipped out on lunch at school, and saved his daily allowance in order to go to Regal cinema - later named Shahinaz cinema- at the end of the week.

Along with his friend, Mohammed took a bus to watch a film every week. "It was best to arrive early, or else we would have to sit crammed near the ventilators," he remembered. To go back home they had to walk 10 kilometres because there was no public transportation at night. "It was definitely worth it," he added with a grin.

Forty years later, Shahinaz cinema, where Mohammed spent some of his best childhood memories, is now closed along with 46 other cinemas nationwide. Only three cinemas remain partially open to young working class men, where they occasionally show live soccer matches, Bollywood or old Hollywood movies from a projector.

Good old days

This went in sharp contrast to the latest Egyptian movies that used to be screened. Famous actors like Farid al-Atrash or Abdulhalim Hafiz appeared on the screens of Aden's cinemas at the same time they appeared in Cairo. In fact, in the mid-1970s the controversial Egyptian movie "al-Asfour", censored in Cairo, was screened in a film festival in Aden.

Mohammed Hamood Al-Hashimi is credited with bringing cinema to Aden and to the region. He began this venture in 1910 by screening mobile shows for a "silent" cinema in the Tawahi district, making Charlie Chaplin a popular figure in Aden. His legacy continued and one of his children, Taha Hamood, "Master Hamood" as he was called, is credited with opening the first cinema on the Arabian Peninsula named Hurricane - after a British aircraft - followed by three other cinemas: Radio Cinema with a facade of an old radio; al-Shariqiyah, andal-Jadidah or New Cinema - named after a well-known cinema in India.

Slowly cinemas spread to the rest of Yemen's southern and eastern provinces, as well as to North Yemen. By the 1950s and 1960s North and South Yemen were home to 49 cinemas. Both men and women used to attend film screenings, and it was a favourite family outing. During this golden era, female artists - such as Sabah Munser, and Fathia Alsagheera - also rose to fame.

By the mid-1990s, most cinemas had closed down. The once packed Hurricane now only has 10 to 15 customers a day, who pay 150 Yemeni Riyals to watch movies from a DVD and a projector. Gone are the days when attending the cinema was an important event, where women and men dressed up as if they were going to a party. Hoping to maintain this cultural hub, Hamood's family renovated the building to make it suitable for theatre production. It has since shown a number of popular plays.

Once known as "Steamer Point" during Aden's time as a British colony; today, passing by the district of Tawahi, with its neglected buildings, and closed down shops, it is difficult to imagine this area as a point of entry for merchants, tourists and cultural exchanges. The New cinema still stands strong in the midst of this changing district, but devoid of its spirit and content. It has been transformed into a multi-purpose wedding hall on the second floor, and a shopping centre on the lower floor. While they cater mostly to weddings, they are also happy to rent it out to those interested in showing movies or to show theatre programmes.

Decline of art

There are many reasons for the decline of the cinema: political, economic and social. Politically, the change in governments impacted the promotion of the arts. When the Socialist government came to power in South Yemen, the General Association for Cinema was created, and many cinemas were nationalised. The Association had the role of importing the latest films, and distributing them at a low price. Film festivals were conducted, and a state-led effort to promote the arts began.

After unification of the North and South in 1990, some of the previously nationalised cinemas were returned to the original owners, and others remained part of the state. The owners could no longer afford to buy the movie rights directly, as the association was not active in importing movies. The new government had no interest in promoting the arts, and the role of the association was eliminated. Today, nothing is known about the budget of this association, and where the money is allocated.

In addition, the political conflict in the early 1990s led to the empowerment of conservative elements, emphasising that the genre is incompatible with family values and immediately turned against the art culture of Aden. As writer Abdulqader Sabri said, "In their eyes it is haram [forbidden], in the eyes of the moderates a 'shame' and in the best case scenario, it is a waste of money."

This has led to threats against cinema owners, not only from conservative elements, but also from speculators who wish to take over the land. Hamood's family wrote an open letter [Ar] to the government in 2012, asking for protection from constant threats by armed men to confiscate cinema Hurricane. The government should not only protect this historic monument, but also encourage the owners to maintain and renovate it. According to local artists, the government has so far provided no aid whatsoever to cinema owners, in fact it has become an obstacle in their way, through corrupt tax collectors, and the constant monitoring of government employees.

New frontiers

Hamood's grandchild, Lutfi, an elegant man in his 50s, also added another reason for the decline of the cinema industry. "Satellite dishes have ruined us," he said while sitting in the cinema- turned-wedding hall. "In the past, if one wanted to watch a movie, they had to go to the cinema, today, they can watch any movie from their home and pay very little for it," he added. The proliferation of electronic media and the internet have also contributed to the disappearances of cinemas in Yemen.

At the same time, some amateur artists believe that the internet has had a reverse impact on them, allowing them to showcase their work to the world. In the absence of proper cinemas, the internet became their arena, and world citizens their audience.

The reality today is that movies, either as institutions of production or as cinema houses, are absent in Yemen's cultural scene. To fill this gap and thirst for art, groups like Khaleej Aden theatre produces plays; and some NGOs screen movies in their offices. In addition, a group of youth are working on a broad campaign to re-open and reinvigorate Yemen's public and private movie theaters.

The government needs to encourage such activities, but others should share the responsibility. When cinema is produced solely with government money, it is propaganda, closer to a political statement than art itself. Cinema needs investment, risk, and freedom to thrive. It is, therefore, important for the private sector and civil society to also take an active interest in promoting the arts.

One might argue that it is too early to discuss culture and art in time of conflict, since it appears as an unnecessary luxury. Yet, it is precisely because Yemen is at a transitional period facing a number of conflicts that art becomes important and necessary.

The more tense the political situation becomes, the greater the need for debate, dialogue and reflection. Cinema and art offer that open space.

Yemeni Delegation Arrives in the U.S. to Train on Dialogue Process

An edited version was posted on Free Arabs entitled: "Government Shutdown? Ask the Yemenis"

Meeting between Yemeni President Hadi and U.S. President Obama to discuss mutual cooperation between both allies (Photo credit: The White House)

WASHINGTON:  A U.N. Special Envoy arrived in Washington today to help a country on the brink of chaos.  The delegation, composed of Special Adviser to Secretary-General on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, along with Yemeni experts and tribal leaders, will share their knowledge on dialogue and conflict resolution.

“Given our ongoing support to Yemen, we believe it’s only fair that the Yemenis help us with the technical assistance; that we in fact paid for.” said State Department Deputy Secretary John Smith.

The US recently ended the government shutdown from October 1 – 17, after Congress failed to enact legislation for appropriations for fiscal year 2014.  The 16 day shutdown is the third longest in U.S. history.

During the shutdown, about 800,000 federal employees were indefinitely furloughed, another 1.3 million were required to report to work without known payment dates, and many services such as the post offices, and park services were suspended or curtailed.  Analysts at IHS Global Insight calculated that it knocked $300 million a day off US economic output. 

Based on Yemen’s reported successful National Dialogue process, the Yemeni delegation will train their American counterparts on how to create an inclusive national dialogue process that engages both the Democrats and the Republicans, in addition to representatives from the Texas Nationalist Movement and the Alaskan Independent party, in an intense and long discussion on important topics.  The main issues to be discussed will include healthcare, gun control, military spending, women’s rights, and also unresolved historic grievances threatening the unity of the country, since the civil war between the north and the south, in the 19^th century.

Secretary Smith had previously praised Yemen's democratic transition and national dialogue conference, a process where the U.S. spent  $10.5 million in assistance.

Given the bleak economic conditions of the U.S. today, it is highly likely that the U.N. will secure a trust fund to support the U.S. national dialogue process.  “Don’t bother raising funds from your own budget, the U.N. will gladly do it for you” said Ahmed Al-Ahmed, a member of the Yemeni delegation to a U.S. official .  “You obviously will not resolve the deep issues, just make it look like you will” he added.

During the shutdown, employees forced to stop working, worried about the looming impact of this shutdown, and many citizens felt caught between the tug of war between the two parties.  The tension resulted in a number of unsettling events; including the self-immolation of a man at the national mall in Washington D.C., and the killing of an unarmed mother suffering from postpartum depression after a car chase from the White House while her toddler was in the car.

Known for it’s long tradition of dialogue and conflict resolution, the Yemeni experts will also train various selected neighborhood watches on how to secure their communities through local committees in the event there is another government shutdown; and in order to avoid a repeat of such actions or an escalation of tensions between the two political parties in conflict.

For centuries, numerous parts of Yemen relied on tribal law to handle conflicts between various entities, as they were able to preserve order and security in the areas with no government presence. 

The U.S. has the highest number of guns per capita in the world, and is home to Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols; the perpetrators of the Oklahoma bombing that killed 168 people on April 19, 1995.

***

While inspired by true events such as the U.S. government shutdown and Yemen’s national dialogue process; much of what is written is fabricated and only intended as a satirical piece. 

Coffee, Yemen's Golden Commodity

First published in Al-Monitor

Mohammed Al-Maisi's coffee nursery (photo by Atiaf Alwazir)

Moving from tree to tree, an old man shows off his treasure. He is so engrossed in his task that, at times, he forgets who is around. His hand, tanned and wrinkled by years of working under the sun, cautiously extends toward a stem and carefully handpicks coffee cherries, while explaining the delicate and intricate process.

Mohammed al-Maisi’s coffee nursery is hidden behind a red mosque in the mountains of Al-Ahjar, one hour away from the capital, Sanaa.

The 60-year-old father of four and grandfather of six has been farming his entire life. “I used to go to school, and when I returned I would help my father plant coffee,” he said. A general and a coffee cultivator, his father passed his love for farming on to his son.

Maisi proudly points to the different coffee varieties he cultivates, which are safely covered by a green plastic tunnel: “aldawairi, tufahi, shibrigi, alahjuri.”

Yemen is credited with being the first place where coffee was consumed as a beverage and cultivated as a commercial crop. Coffee drinking appeared in the middle of the 15th century, in the Sufi monasteries of Yemen.

“Coffee was everything for Yemen,” said Sheikh Shabbir Ezzi, a businessman at Al Ezzi Industries. “It’s a gift from our ancestors. You can see how important coffee was for Yemen from the emblem of the country. Inside the bird’s heart is a coffee plant.” 

While coffee has proved lucrative for some business ventures, many farmers have not been able to live on coffee alone.

Since the 1950s, Yemeni coffee has been facing great challenges. In 2011, coffee export was 20 times less than 150 years ago. Once a world-renowned port, Al-Makha — from which the English adaptation of the word “mocha” comes — is now almost out of business. In fact, according to Peet’s Coffee & Tea, the word mocha “became associated with chocolate because Europeans' first experiences with cocoa, in the 17th century, reminded them of the bittersweet coffee they imported from Yemen.”

Today, farmers often do not get remuneration comparable to the quality of their coffee for a variety of reasons, including the disconnect between the farmers and the market abroad.

Maisi grew coffee all his life, and is nostalgic about the good old days, when coffee was a “golden commodity.” He is forced to diversify his crops with qat — a mild narcotic commonly chewed by a significant majority of the country — to survive. “Financially, I’m doing very well. Yet, I cannot attribute it to coffee alone,” he said.

“The government should help me remove the qat plants and support me to plant more coffee instead, as a pilot project,” he added. “We receive nothing from the government. They do not care about our resources.”

He was surprised to hear that this idea is in fact being implemented in the beautiful mountains of Haraaz by the local community and Al Ezzi Industries. The enterprise is currently working with 3,500 coffee farmers — including 1,000 from Haraaz— providing them with incentives to produce better quality coffee and paying their farming cooperatives directly to achieve long-term sustainability.

Their sophisticated post-harvesting techniques of fusing tradition and modernity, and their knowledge of marketing abroad using Yemeni coffee’s uniqueness and reputation, has enabled their success. According to their website, Al Ezzi Industries implements “globally accepted standards of grading and classifications, fair trade systems and traceability by utilizing the very latest technology.”

Their knowledge of this niche market enables them to connect to various markets in the West. Maisi, on the other hand, was unaware that hipsters in New York City’s Williamsburg neighborhood sip a cup of Arabica coffee after paying about a quarter of his daily salary. “Maybe we should move to America,” he jokingly said, after being told the cost of a cup of Arabica at one of the many coffee shops in North America.

As they sip their delicious Arabica coffee, many customers are unaware of the long process it takes to make a cup. The beans used to make their coffee can only begin to be harvested five years after being planted at 2,500 meters (8,202 feet) above sea level, a unique climate for coffee growing. “In Yemen, you have a perfect balance of the warmth and shade that you need to create good coffee,” said Ezzi.

After changing color from green to red, the coffee cherry is picked by hand, a labor-intensive and difficult process. “This is why I have many children, the more hands the easier,” said Maisi giggling. He added, “I usually prefer to pick them myself, because if done incorrectly one can damage the stem or even the tree.” It needs patience, care and observation, and is very time-consuming.

Maisi rotates among the trees approximately three times a month, choosing only the cherries that are at the peak of ripeness. After harvesting, the cherries are cleaned and then placed in the sun to dry up to four weeks. Finally, he removes the last layers of dry skin.

Maisi does not toss away the coffee husk. Instead, Yemenis use every aspect of the coffee plant. The beans make traditional coffee known as Bun that can also be ground to fit different needs — French press, espresso, Turkish coffee and so on. From the husk, Yemenis make the popular coffee drink known as qishr, which is spiced with cardamom and ginger and known for its antioxidants. This is the most popular drink in Yemen. They also infuse the leaves to make a red tea-like herbal medicine for women with postpartum hemorrhage.

If a compromise is reached between short-term and long-term investment, between cultural authenticity and productivity and between local and international market needs, Yemeni coffee could regain its worldwide status.

On the way back to the nursery, in a rusty voice, Maisi joyfully sang Ayoub Tarish’s famous song: “Yemeni coffee, oh pearl, oh treasure above the tree; Whoever grows you, will never be poor or humiliated.”

Justice for Hassan and Khaled will show if Yemen has really changed

First published in the National

In the mid 1950s, the famous Adeni poet Lutfi Jaafar Amaan wrote: "In the meadow of impossible, we will plant the happiness and hopes of a generation". Six decades later, his grandson would be shot dead in a killing that diminishes what little hope remains for his generation.

On May 15 this year, Amaan's grandson, Hassan, 20, and his friend Khaled, 21, were shot in cold blood as they attempted to pass a wedding procession.

It is customary to allow a procession to pass without interruption. The young men's innocent defiance of this custom cost them their lives because the procession they passed was linked to a powerful political and tribal figure.

For years, powerful men ­ be they businessmen, politicians, or tribesmen ­robbed citizens of their right to justice and cost thousands their lives. The former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, allowed influential corrupt men to do as they please with no accountability.

Numerous stories and personal experiences of injustices at the hands of people linked to the government prompted many to participate in the 2011 uprising, demanding justice and the rule of law.

While tribal law provided order and security for communities outside the government eye for hundreds of years, some powerful and corrupt individuals had been given a green light by the government to do as they please.

Many young revolutionaries dreamed of a new Yemen where the law is upheld and all citizens would be treated equally. Hope was placed in the hands of the national unity government and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC).

Yet, for many the case of Hassan and Khaled crushed their faith in the transitional process. "They call this the new Yemen. How is it new when everything is the same?" said Ali, a taxi driver and education ministry employee.

"Corruption is still there, except instead of only one group of people stealing, now you have many."

The person who is accused of killing Hassan and Khaled was identified as a nephew of Sheikh Ali Abd rabbou Al Awadhi, a powerful tribal sheikh, an NDC delegate and high­ranking member of the Islamist Islah party.

This case has been widely publicised. To many, this case resembles the fate of Yemen.

As writer Salah Al Dakkak put it: "It is not simply an act against a citizen, it is an act against citizenship."

Most importantly, it has become the test for the performance of the transitional government.

Three months after Hassan and Khaled died, their killer has not been arrested and a file for the case has not even been officially opened in the Ministry of Interior.

Every day that passes without justice for Hassan and Khaled is a day where the NDC loses its credibility in the eyes of the people.

Sheikh Al Awadhi remains a member of the NDC. At a time when revolutionaries hoped for a complete change in the system and a break from the past's legacy of mass violations, this case has not only enshrined impunity in national law, but also in the psyche of Yemeni citizens.

"Some are demanding my arrest, as if I am the killer, while those who engaged in mass murder enjoy freedom and immunity," said

Sheikh Al Awadhi in a statement he released to media. The immunity law he is referring to was stipulated in the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) transfer of power deal in return for Mr. Saleh's resignation, protecting him and his aides from prosecution for "political crimes" during his rule.

The GCC agreement also requires steps on transitional justice and "measures to ensure that violations of human rights and humanitarian law do not occur in the future". A law on Transitional Justice (TJ) and National Reconciliation has been under discussion since February last year but the cabinet failed to reach consensus on it and the law is currently with President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi awaiting approval.

The draft law provides for truth commissions to determine reparations, ranging from material compensation to apologies and memorials. It would also have the authority to compel testimony or the release of documents, and would publish draft reports inviting comments from civil society organisations and the public at large.

These are positive steps that provide some hope but major concerns remain. Will President Hadi and members of the current government, who were part of the old regime, allow for the commission to investigate crimes that occurred while they were officials in the previous government?

According to the lawyer Haykal Bafana: "Transitional Justice is the mirror image of the immunity clause. What the TJ bill requires is an explicit acceptance by the victims of the immunity law that was approved by Yemen's parliament last year."

In effect, victims can seek justice through the TJ law but it will still be subservient to the immunity law and the GCC deal.

Another major question is that of implementation. Too often in countries where the rule of law is ignored, legislation provides decent protection for citizens, but implementation is lacking. Many fear that the transitional justice law will remain ink on paper, never to be implemented.

Despite these negative trends, local community­based initiatives are on the rise. "No one is above the law" flyers that have decorated many cars in major cities around the country. Letters have been delivered to officials through street protests demanding justice for Hassan and Khaled.

The two men's families are vowing to pursue real justice ­ but to do so with words as weapons rather than responding with arms for arms or blood for blood.

The Myth of the "Yemen Model"

First published in Huffington Post Blog on May 29 2013.

(This post was written in response to an article by Thomas Friedman in the NYT.  It should not be taken as an analysis of the NDC entirely.  Some of the positives aspects of the NDC have been neglected in this post because it is a response to the overly positive narratives and premature announcements of success of the the NDC which lacked constructive criticism).

Shortly following the internationally funded uncontested election in Yemen, a high-ranking western diplomat berated me for not voting. When I asked him, "would people in your country be happy with a one-person election?" He responded: "people in my country are not trying to kill each other!"
While not all diplomats think this way, unfortunately, that simplistic and ignorant statement is what drives much of western policy on Yemen -- if there is a policy -- and it is also why it is expected that Yemenis should accept half solutions -- should in fact celebrate them!
Maybe misconceptions of Arabs as apolitical, who were just "awakened" by the "Arab Spring," leads to the belief that anything is a step forward. These misconceptions, if internalized, lead to flawed analysis, and worse they can become disastrous policies.

This is egregiously exemplified by Thomas Friedman's recent New York Times op-ed (on May 11) where, for example, he states that "the good news is that -- for now -- a lot of Yemenis really want to give politics a chance." Friedman is referring to the internationally backed National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in Yemen. The NDC began in March 2013 and is to last for six months, with 565 delegates tasked with providing recommendations and culminating in writing of a new constitution. Friedman's statement attempts to celebrate Yemenis, while in fact downplaying an entire history of political participation and ignores Yemen's cultural tradition of dialogue and political pluralism. Yemen has had dialogues before and has operated in a relatively diverse political sphere. The movement for change in 2011 is a culmination of years of activities in the south and north.

Neglecting all of that naturally does not present a thought-out article. While the NDC helped bring new political actors to the forefront creating new social transformations, and while the threat of war has been delayed on the short term; nevertheless, it is too soon to make a grand statement about the success or failure of this process, and definitely too early to announce that the NDC and the overall transitional process is a model to emulate, as Friedman suggests.

Renowned Yemeni journalist Sami Ghaleb critiqued Friedman's piece saying: "Friedman's analysis is the perfect example of the way the US makes premature political assessment on changes in the Arab world. It's the fast food assessment." This fast food assessment is one that ignores long-term impact and also historic factors that influence current reality.

Friedman is not the first to make a grand statement about the NDC. In fact, his piece echoes the statements made by U.S. ambassador to Yemen Gerald M. Feierstein on March 29, 2013 and by Yemen's President later in early May. "Today, we are so close to make a complete success and awaiting the dialogue's results, which will forge the new future of Yemen," said President Hadi during his meeting with UN envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar.

These statements of success or failure lack depth and fail to define success. For the international community, success might be defined by the fact that a diverse group of Yemenis are in the same room debating (not a first in Yemen, although media likes to propose it as such). For others, success might be defined by the national input in writing a new constitution, or the solving of deep-rooted conflicts in the north and south of the country. This of course, has lead to conflicting ideas on what is expected of the dialogue and hence will most likely lead to disappointment regardless of the output. Ideally, the NDC should be a process to build a new social contract between the people and the governing power centers. Yet, the majority of citizens feel disconnected from this process.

The average person has not felt the impact of the dialogue, and many outside the cities have not even heard about it. If Friedman had spoken to "some of the most interesting journalists, social activists and politicians [he] met in the Arab world" whom he mentioned in his 2010 op-ed, a long list of concerns about the transitional process would have been highlighted.

Just a week before the heavily advertised and financed NDC, I asked a woman in a village near the city of Hodeida "What do you think of the National Dialogue?" A blank stare shaped her face, followed by: "What? What's that?" I proceeded to tell her about the NDC, and then asked her which priorities she hopes would be discussed in the dialogue. "Our stomach," she responded! "We are hungry and we need jobs," she added. She is not the only one who is unfamiliar with the dialogue.
While the recent field visits by members of the NDC to various cities are a positive step, they nevertheless remain closed to certain groups of people. In addition, the attempts so far to engage the general population have failed, partly due to the emphasis on using online medium for marketing in a country where 86 percent of the population do not have access to the internet. The conference location at the expensive and secluded Movenpick hotel with high security adds to the alienation of conference participants from the general society. As lawyer Haykal Bafana said on twitter, "in just over 2 months, Yemen's National Dialogue has spent US$9,282,000 - no tangible benefit so far."
In addition, each NDC participant receives $100 or $180 (for those coming from outside the capital) per day, in a country where 40 percent of the population lives under $2 a day. A participant told me "I don't believe this [NDC] will bring about any change, but I can't find a job either, so why not participate?"

This not only destroys any sense of civic duty but it is also in contrast to the two years of civic engagement felt during the uprising. The wide range of volunteer activities by revolutionaries was an important stop in promoting civic engagement. Yet, the way the NDC is organized is also reminiscent of Saleh's patronage system. It creates what writer Ibrahim Mothana calls, "Per-diocracy" rather than democracy.

These challenges have made the NDC the butt of new nicknames: "the market of illusion", "national sleep hypnosis conference", and "the foreign national dialogue". The role of external players in Yemen is perceived negatively for a number of reasons.

First, the way the international community, and precisely the Group of 10 Ambassadors, have divided tasks related to the transitional process amongst themselves, in their capacity as "facilitators of the GCC Initiative" feels like an imposition to many. For example, the United States is in charge of military restructuring, France the Constitution, the United Kingdom policing, and the United Nations the NDC (with partnership and support from the other countries). This created the perception that the international community is imposing its agenda rather than cooperating or aiding in the transformation.

Second, the transitional process and the NDC are heavily financed by the international community supports the above idea. The Yemen National Dialogue and Constitutional Reform Trust Fund (YNDCRTF) was established to support Yemen's dialogue. The UN program stands at $23.1 million, of which $15.1 million is to finance the Secretariat and conference. In addition, donors from various countries are spending millions on civil society work related to the NDC. The U.S. for instance will spend $10.5 million in coordination with the Secretariat to provide technical and operational assistance to the dialogue offices.

Third, the interference in local decisions by international actors has increased that perception. For example, U.N. envoy Jamal Benomar had the final say in the allocation of representation at the dialogue. In addition, U.S. Ambassador Fierstein's continued press conferences, attendance of NDC and TV announcements on the progress of the transitional process, has made him obtain the title of "Sheikh of Yemen" and has served to enhance the wide held perception that it is an externally lead process with an international rather than an indigenous local agenda.

In addition, many believe that key decisions will be made among Yemen's power centers outside the margins of the dialogue and that this dialogue conference is just an expensive "show" forcing Benomar to announce on May 13 that: "nothing is being cooked outside the conference halls." Nevertheless, a key example of important decisions being taken outside the dialogue is the military restructuring decree, which was announced by President Hadi while the dialogue is ongoing without input from dialogue participants.

Fourth, there is a significant divide between aspirations of the civic movement for change and interests of key foreign and regional players favoring the traditional elite seen through their support for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)'s power transfer agreement, which lead former President Saleh's resignation from power for his vice president in exchange for immunity from prosecution for him and 400 others. The root causes of discontent have not been addressed, which deepens the rift and mistrust in the process.

Last and most important concern, is the inclusiveness of the NDC. While some new entities have in fact been introduced to the political scene, many of the leaders of the Southern Movement boycotted the NDC because they do not believe it will solve the deep grievances felt by the people in the South or their calls for secession. In fact, many of the topics discussed cannot really be negotiated until the other more important issues such as the southern question are dealt with. As Waseem Al-Saqqaf, southern movement activist said:

"NDC members from the Southern Movement are there to discuss the southern issue. Yet, they had to join other working groups such as the one on security and military reform. How can a southerner who believes in the right to self determination or in secession discuss restructuring of a unified army?"
With the majority of southerners outside the negotiation, it is difficult to foresee how the Southern issue can be solved.

In the week Friedman wrote his very optimistic piece, power lines were attacked, a fighter jet crashed in the capital (third one in the past six months), and Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia were deported. The Yemeni economy is collapsing, people cannot find jobs, electricity cuts are constant in the capital, children are going to sleep hungry, and the same people who ruled the country for the past 33 years are still in power.

These concerns should also be priorities in the national dialogue. For a process to bring about lasting change, the process itself should matter. No matter how "successful" the outputs may be, it should be internally driven one, or else no one will feel ownership of the process, and it will be easy to abandon the results.

The Flawed Media Narrative on Yemen

First Published in YourMiddleEast

Imagine the following: after weeks of convincing his editors that it is safe to travel to the US, a journalist from Landistan arrived in Kentucky state. Before his arrival, he read many news articles on the country and followed a number of journalists and activists on Twitter. He had no time to read history books that would have provided context to the situation.

In Louisville, Kentucky, he went to visit the school where student Mathew Ward killed the schoolmaster in 1850, followed by visits to the states of New Hampshire, Ohio, California, Maryland, Illinois, Oklahoma, Connecticut, and Texas to visit the schools that witnessed gun-related incidents in 2012. The journalist met with families of the victims and of the perpetrators in the nine states.

He then wrote a story entitled “America’s Gangs and Guns,” where he boasted about his visits outside the capital, which gave him a great overview of the country. In his article, he mentioned “the bloody Americans” at least three times. Never once did he highlight any of the anti-gun campaigns or speak to Americans who are against gun violence. The friendly and diverse American population, the innovation of its scientists and creativity of its artists was also missing from the story. Instead he visited Walmart, the large discount department store that sells firearms, and wrote: “while the son is choosing which candy to buy, his father is choosing which type of bullet.”

You may think it is impossible for such a bias article to appear in a mainstream well-respected western newspaper. However, when it comes to Yemen this is unfortunately quite common.

Yemen’s media reputation

Yemen, the land inhabited by 24 million people from different backgrounds, regions, sects, dialects and landscapes has been reduced to Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), wars, poverty, Qat, tribalism, or the ancestral home of Osama Bin Laden.

Reading mainstream media today, one imagines that AQAP has taken over the entire country, and that militants are roaming freely throughout. One might also come to the conclusion that most Yemenis are in fact militants.

The country with a long history that was once hailed as Arabia Felix, land of generosity, wisdom, coffee, the first sky scrapers, the land with many queens and great architecture, is now only about the hysteria of the decade: terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is not a problem, it is, but it is not the sole problem, and the way media reports on it with no analysis of impact of the war on terror, nor any depth, simply magnifies the problem.

On September 30, 2011, I went to the streets of the capital to get people’s reaction on the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric who was accused of being a main recruiter for AQAP. To my surprise, many people responded, “who is Anwar Al-Awlaki?” This highlights the sharp disconnect between Yemenis and the media reporting on them.

In mainstream articles and books, there is hardly any mention of the majority of Yemenis who dislike extremism. A notable survey in 2011 concluded that 86% of Yemenis have an unfavorable opinion of Al Qaeda. Media failed to report that when the American teacher Joel Shrum was killed, many protests were held in the city of Taiz against the killing, and against extremism. In fact one year later, people in Taiz organized a silent memorial to remember him on the anniversary of his death. Only local media reported this event.

Al-Qaeda has overshadowed most reporting on Yemen. Mainstream media has not only perpetuated and enhanced stereotypes but by doing so, has unintentionally caused damage to Yemen’s reputation. Journalists are slowly erasing the long history of Yemen and its traditions, and depriving people of their voice. Yemen at large remains extensively unexamined.

There is no doubt that constant one-sided reporting filled with stereotypes breeds hatred of the other. The singling out of Yemenis at airports abroad merely because of their passport has caused many to feel unfairly targeted and some believe that they are victims of this bad reputation.

It is no wonder that at home, some have began feeling suspicious. “Are you taking pictures to make us look bad?” asked a taxi driver to a foreign journalist. “No that is not my intention, you have a beautiful country,” he responded. Driver exhaled in relief explaining that sometimes journalists pick the most un-common event and say this is Yemen.

When I told young activists about this article, Amira Al-Arasi said, “yes, yes our reputation abroad is terrible,” she jokingly explained that Yemeni citizenship alone cannot be taken seriously. “This is why when Tawakkul Karman won the Nobel Peace Prize, she also received another citizenship,” she said, and the crowd of activists around her laughed.

The televised revolution somewhat helped change the perception of Yemenis in the eyes of their Arab neighbors. In some Arab countries today, the first question is no longer do you chew qat? – but rather, have you been to Change Square? However, this has not yet spilled over to mainstream western media.

In fact, during the uprising, Yemen’s coverage was weak when compared with other Arab Spring countries (with the exception of Bahrain). While media covered the art and comedy in Egypt’s Tahrir square, the poetry, theatre, and music of Change Square was hardly covered when it came to the Yemeni protests.

“If the Yemen protests had been streaming on western TVs during 2011, it would have increased awareness of the country outside of the terrorism-related news, and would have generated more interest in Yemen,” said a western journalist.

“Unfortunately that didn’t happen,” she added.

Why only fear-based media?
For a number of reasons, the media narrative on Yemen is completely flawed. One aspect is the lack of knowledge on the complexities of the country.

“The editors I work with have never been to Yemen, they know at best – only a little piece of what is already published – and are often people with a liking for clichés,” said Sara, a European journalist.

Parachute journalists also know very little about the country and when reporting assess it only based on what they see in comparison to other countries, not what they see of Yemen in comparison to its own past – because they often do not know Yemen’s recent history, hence it affects their analysis of the current situation, making their reports diluted and superficial.

Even worse, is the fact that many write about sensitive topics from their desks in London, New York, Paris or Dubai without ever stepping foot in Yemen.

Who needs to when you can just ask a few online activists what they think?

Many of the freelance journalists based in Yemen, start their career here. With time their knowledge of the country increases significantly, especially when establishing a wide range of contacts. One advantage in Yemen is the ease at which contacts can be established even at the highest levels. Seniority is not an issue, nor is experience; young freelance journalists are able to meet and interview top officials. Yemenis in general are often very willing to speak to journalists as well.

Yet despite their knowledge compared to the parachute journalists, many have not been able to pitch the stories they want. Except for a few of the very established freelance journalists, the majority complains of lack of response from the editors.

“The interest, generally speaking, just isn’t that strong,” said a freelance Western journalist. “Yemen isn’t the same as Egypt, Iraq or Afghanistan,” said another western journalist.
As the saying goes, “if it bleeds, it leads” and in the case of Yemen it unfortunately became, “only if it bleeds, it appears.”

Today’s journalism on Yemen is no longer about getting the facts right, or inspiring people to think independently, it is about who can write the most sensationalized story on the country – no matter how many times it has already been told – because that is what sells.

The irony is that editors claim there is no interest for stories from Yemen, yet few stories that are non-security linked are published, so how do they assess that interest?

While editors often do not take stories beyond headline news, young journalists who are trying to build a career in mainstream media feel pressured to only write inside the box provided. Then because they only write within that box, that is what editors expect. It’s a vicious cycle.

Journalists seem unable to openly criticize this cycle or the negative coverage of Yemen. When I asked a number of freelance journalists questions for this article, many agreed to be quoted but without their name or nationality. The life of freelancers hangs in the hands of these editors, but at the same time, editors should know what the journalists who work for them really think.

What can be done?
When writing, journalists should keep in mind that just as Norwegians are not defined by Anders Behring Breivik, Yemenis do not want to be defined by his Yemeni equivalents. As obvious as it sounds, many have not yet internalized the idea that humanity transcends boundaries, only when that happens will reporting change and the orientalist approach to analysis may be reduced.

Journalists will begin to report what they see not solely in comparison to what they know of the West. For example, instead of the failed state theory, which has been discussed for two decades, we might read more about tribal and community methods of maintaining peace. Because of “its rigid and Eurocentric approach, the failed state thesis is unable to recognize the strategies employed by states like Yemen to ensure their survival, which include the purposeful production of chaos,” wrote PhD Candidate Sophia Dingli.

In addition, stories may transcend the usual topics, and may even focus more on the people of Yemen rather than on the person writing the story. For example, instead of stories on the bravery of journalists going to the weapon market, we may read about the relatively low crime rates despite the high number of private firearms.

We may also read stories about young juveniles on hunger strike protesting for their colleagues on death row, campaigns to reduce the use of qat, political satire, young girls turning to solar energy for power, economic development and street artists promoting awareness of social issues.
When editors do not agree to publish these articles, some journalists decide to write in alternative media. “There I work with editors who are ready to publish stories written from new angels,” said Sara. “I write for money, that is what I do, and then I realize I must also write for free to do Yemen justice,” she added.

Yemenis in the diaspora, and those who speak English inside the country should be more proactive in providing feedback to journalists and editors, and publically acknowledging when mistakes are published. The truth is, there is no media watch. Anyone can write anything misleading, incorrect, or bias and mainstream media will often publish it.