War Rant - Part 1: The War Narrative and the Death of Philosophy

Let me start off by saying this is NOT a research paper. It’s simply the first part of a longer rant. I want to get all the negative energy out of my system and into the wild (sorry universe!).

Gone are the early days of 2011 when no question and no theory were off limits. We argued and we disagreed in a community where we felt safe without judgement or prejudice. Today, we are living a different time. A time where thought is frowned upon, where mere questions are unwelcome. A time where even academics became reductionists, generalizing, and placing people in boxes.

Politics without knowledge has become the sport of the nation. We’ve become a group who no longer looks back, and does not look into the future. We reduce everything to one word answers, and we don’t have the patience to listen to deeper discussions. We exchange insults with those we disagree with, we trade punches with a total disregard for one another.

Here are four war narratives we are told we shouldn’t question – because after all, why should we use our brain?

The war-coalition is there to protect democracy, legitimacy and the people

Just like Saleh used the pretext of democracy and "constitutional legitimacy" to attack protesters in the 2011 uprising, President Hadi in exile, is using "legitimacy" to attack his people, despite the fact that his term had ended and he had no popular support among Yemenis, including very few amongst the Southern resistance.

It goes without saying that the people in Aden are suffering from two wars, an external and internal one, with rampant diseases and lack of humanitarian and medical aid. We should not by any means diminish this, but in almost four months of bombing, war is still ongoing. The Saudi-led, US/EU backed war coalition has not succeeded in its supposed mission to win the war against Houthis or in “restoring hope” like promised.

In addition to the numbers of deaths and wounded, the catastrophic humanitarian situation, the apparent destruction of Yemen’s already very weak infrastructure, and the targeting of civilian structures including bridges, hospitals, wedding halls, wheat and dairy factories have been hit, in addition to a chicken farm etc, is a clear sign of the war coalition’s deliberate intent to destroy what little remains of the country’s infrastructure and force Yemen [not just Houthis] into total dependency.

There is only one group to blame for the war

It is common sense that in a war, all sides participating will be responsible for civilian casualties. While there are layers of issues involved here, layers of responsibilities, the war narrative insists that everyone must focus only on one group.

Depending on how far back we go, we could blame different people and groups. A historian for example might go back to 1926 when Imam Yahya declared himself king of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, and blame his harsh, theocratic and discriminatory ruling. We could fast forward to the Saleh/Ali Mohsin era of corruption, poverty, neglect, lack of institutional building, centralized powers, and vicious wars in the South and north. We could blame Saudi for its long hegemony and funding of extremist center throughout Yemen since the 1980s - with the blessing of Saleh/Ali Mohsin. 

We could blame the spread of Wahabi ideology for the spread of AQAP and US for its failed war on terror that only exacerbated militants. We could blame Qatar for all the money pouring in. We could blame the Islah party for hijacking the revolution and the weakness and/or tacit support of the other “opposition” parties including the Socialists. 

 We could blame the transitional government for their focus on power grabbing, neglecting dire issues facing the people, and relying on the west for legitimacy rather than their own people. We could blame the UN, EU and US for their insistence on calling the transitional process a success and hence refusing to address the obvious issues. We could blame the IMF for pressuring Hadi to lift all fuel subsidies, increasing prices by 60 to 90 per cent overnight, without prior notice or measures to absorb the shock. We could blame Houthis for violently expanding throughout Yemen. We could blame Iran because like Saudi, it sees Yemenis as pawns in a political game to be supported and abandoned as and when it suits them.

It’s clear there are many actors to blame and it's important to discuss these points.  I'm sure the opinions will be as diverse as the people. The blame will shift, depending on personal analysis. But let's keep the door of discussion open, because a sickness must be diagnosed properly in order to find the cure.

Those who focus on foreign intervention don’t care about the civil war in the South

Civilians in the end of the day don’t want to be casualties of any war, local or foreign. Murder is murder, by a bomb or a bullet. Yet just because people focus on one advocacy strategy, such as focusing on the foreign intervention, does not mean that they are prioritizing a death over another or disregarding what is happening in the South. Some chose to focus on the civil war, while others chose to focus on the foreign intervention. Both are necessary.

Why have some activists decided to focus on the international intervention?

1) The Saudi-led war coalition is supported by UK and US. These countries are directly involved in logistics, arms trade and in providing intelligence. Raising awareness to citizens of these countries that their governments are involved in yet another war, is very important.

2)  The fact that Saudi is a leading buyer of weapons from US, France, UK means that it is in the interest of western powers to keep a war going. Arms trade keeps economies afloat, in fact makes them prosper. This is about the power and policy of those who drop bombs (the Saudi government) and those who profit from them being dropped (the US/UK).  This is not simply about Yemen but about the military industrial complext as well.

3) The “international community” has time and again condemned the Houthis, and even the UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR 2216) only condemned Houthis/Saleh. Except for a statement by the EU Parliament, they have not done the same for the foreign intervention, hence why advocacy in this area is necessary.

4) Focusing on the bigger picture of the war is a way to connect the movements for social justice throughout the world, because while the struggles may take different forms, they all, share the need for a new world order.

'Objectivity must be maintained'

Noam Chomsky once said “there’s a very high ideal that’s celebrated by the elite media, and that’s to maintain objectivity – objectivity has a very different meaning in media culture – it means repeating accurately anything that’s said within the beltway [Washington, DC]. If you do that, it’s objective, if you go beyond that it’s bias, it’s subjective, it’s emotional and so on and so forth.” In the case of the war on Yemen, we also hear calls for objectivity but the truth is it’s all bullshit! It just means do not question the war narrative.

Today for example we see some of the same people who were against drone strikes because of their impact on civilian casualties, now cheering for bombs by coalition airstrikes. When we question this shift, we are labeled as subjective. 

When we ask a simple question such as, why doesn’t the media write “Saudi backed Yemeni government in exile” but insists on writing “Iran-backed rebels” we are immediately ‘judged’ on the wrong side. While both are competing now for influence, the fact is Saudi has been directly involved in Yemeni internal affairs for much longer than Iran and yet there is no mention of Saudi hegemony in the dominant narrative. [I know I will be trolled for this!]

This objectivity “bully” has pushed people towards virulent self-censorship. In the private sphere, people message me and share many thoughts. It seems many are afraid to be open about their own feelings. Some of my friends in the South for example who are staunchly against Houthi takeover are also against the Saudi intervention, but they feel they cannot say this publically.  I personally feel the same urge to self-censor, and hence by writing this I hope to shake this feeling away.  

The above four war narratives are just some examples of many. I highlight them because unfortunately some activists have fallen in the trap of pushing others towards a ruthless demagogic take on the war narrative.

In our effort to constantly blame those who have a different strategy, we become blind to the fact that we’re actually on the same side. This I believe is intended to divide us and in order to weaken the civil voice. Instead of focusing on what we all agree on – peace - we’re too busy pointing fingers at each other.

If only we (myself included) cared less about our "online" image or our "activist brand", and focused more on real life activism and collaboration, maybe we would’ve gotten somewhere. In the end of the day, we should be working together. Let's not let the war narrative dictate who our enemies or friends are.

While Yemen is drowning in interventions, let's free our own minds. Let's maintain our mental independence. Let’s ask questions, let’s think out loud, let’s argue, and let’s debate.

See War Rant - Part 2: War Awakens Burried Prejudices

It's not a Sunni- Shi’a Conflict, dummy!

Last week, my young cousin in the second grade ran inside after an explosion shook the windows. “I don’t mind when the house shakes, I just don’t want to die in it,” he said out of breath. “You won’t.” I reassured him. He then went back to play. I followed him outside to find a group of children playing a political game: President Hadi v. Abdulmalik Al-Houthi. Their mission was to free the cats held hostage. As I sat there watching this game unfold, I heard them throw many terms around: democracy, justice, national dialogue conference etc. The words Sunni or Shi’a, were never mentioned.

This is not surprising given the fact that affiliation to a madhab (religious school of thought) rarely comes up in conversations in Yemen. This is slowly changing, and many fear that this historic diversity and tolerance might become something of the past.

To say there are no sectarian tendencies or cleavages in Yemen is incorrect (as Dr. Shelagh Weir explained from the 1980s), but the oversimplification of explaining the current power struggle entirely on historic theological differences between Sunnis and Shi’as is incorrect as well.

This is incorrect for a variety of reasons that I will summarize here.

First, while no statistics have been collected on the composition of Ansarullah, commonly known as Houthis; it is believed that many of their members are Zaydi but also come from various religious schools of thought in Shi’a and Sunni Islam, including Ismaili, Shafiʿi, and Ja’afari. Many Sunni tribesmen and soldiers have also joined the Houthis and fight along their side. In fact, prominent Shafi’i leaders like Saad Bin Aqeel, a Mufti of Ta’iz, are amongst Houthis’ leaders and in fact presented a Friday sermon at one of the sit-ins prior to their advance into the capital.

Second, Zaydis share similar doctrines and jurisprudential opinions with Sunni scholars. As Helen Lackner, author of Why Yemen Matters? stated “this has little, if anything, to do with theological differences or a Sunni/Shi’a split, but is based on issues of social cohesion, including tribal allegiance, power, control and (the absence of) development and social security funding for an increasingly impoverished and suffering population.”

Third, socially speaking Yemenis have lived and continue to live together without segregation. Muslims in Yemen, from the various schools of thought, whether Sunni or Shi’a, pray side-by-side, people intermarry without any special procedures or “conversions,” and communal violence based on confessional membership has been rare.

Fourth, according to Houthis’ their actions do not aim “exclusively or even primarily at establishing a Zaydi political order” as Stacey Phillbrick Yadav, Associate Professor and author of “Islamists and the State: Legitimacy and Institutions in Yemen and Lebanon” states. She adds, “Similarly, the fact that Islah’s membership is predominantly Sunni doesn’t mean it is working to reestablish the caliphate.”

Fifth, not all Zaydis are Houthis. Well-known Zaydi scholars and religious centers have been divided on their stance towards the Houthis.

Sixth, missing from the analysis is the link between rural deprivation and wider political contestations, and conflicts. The longer the transitional government ignored people’s grievances, the more the ranks of the discontented swelled. Last straw was when the government lifted the fuel subsidies overnight without warning in 29 July 2014, increasing the price of fuel and diesel by 60 and 90 percent. Mass protests erupted, and Houthis capitalized on these grievances, and by so doing, gained a significant number of new membership from various bacgrounds (not only Zaydis) which helped them expand.

Seventh, while sectarian cleavages are becoming exploited by various groups, such as when al-Qaeda uses the rise of Houthis to recruit more people to defend “the Sunnis," it is important to remember that those fighting al-Qaeda are not all Shi’a nor are they all Houthis.

Eigth, if this was a sectarian issue, Saleh (who is technically Zaydi) would not have engaged in six wars with the Houthis from 2004 - 2010. It appears that today’s former enemies have formed a temporary alliance.  This indicates that these conflicts are political in nature.

Ninth, there is no sectarian dimension to the victims of the violations by the Houthis such as the detention of activists and journalists in recent protests.

Finally, while the geopolitical tensions between the various political camps of course impacts what is happening on the ground, it is incorrect to explain the political dynamics in the country as simply foreign interference. In addition, narrowly framing the ongoing issue as sectarian absolves the transitional government from their duties as it helps them blame everything on foreign actors, rather than making them accountable for the localized grievances found throughout the majority of Yemen. It also absolves Houthis from the violations they have committed blaming their actions on theological differences instead of political aspirations.

As these ten points demonstrate, the issue cannot be reduced to a theological war. Analysis must include these nuances in order to better understand the ongoing political dynamics. Without a proper understanding, policies will continue to be flawed and no solutions will be formulated, which would perpetuate the cycle of violence.

The Yemeni public, and its diverse reactions to recent events

There is an array of reactions to the recent events in Yemen. While it is difficult to generalize how people feel, this is an attempt to demonstrate (briefly) the various reactions by ordinary Yemenis.

We’re just confused: the majority of people are simply confused. With rumors flying around, and facts very difficult to verify, confusion looms and anxiety escalates. President Hadi added to that confusion by calling the events a “conspiracy” only after he signed the U.N. brokered peace deal.

What the.... just happened?: they were shocked at how fast the situation changed in a couple of days.  They do not know what to expect and believe that time will tell. They are generally happy that some iconic elite who are said to block the transition process are out of power, and are content with the reconciliatory language in the national agreement, and in Abdulmalik Al-Houthi's most recent speech . Yet, they remain skeptical and hope that these words carry real intent and are not merely ink on paper. They fear that while the Houthis have legitimate grievances and were oppressed, some of their recent actions are worrisome and questions their peaceful rhetoric.

Yay: those who are very happy about the recent events, they feel that the Houthis revived hope in a “hijacked revolution” and gave them a sense of pride in a movement that has challenged the grip of the elite, and controversial GCC initiative. They are also happy that after being neglected by all major political power groups, the Houthis have imposed their demands for basic rights and inclusion on the political establishment.

They are the devil: those who believe that the Houthis are merely “Iranian agents” dominated by foreign agenda. They believe that the Houthis never had any grievances and that the Saleh regime was right to start the war in 2004.

Don’t violate our Rights!: this group fears that Sanaa may now be run by a radical religiously conservative armed group that bans personal freedoms, most notably related to freedom of expression, art and women’s rights. They also want the Houthis’ armed militia to retreat from the capital as soon as possible. They feel depressed thinking that all groups in power have so far continued the same practices. This feeling was exacerbated by the closure of Suheil channel and storming of homes of some notable Islah leaders.

As long as we live..: this group is mostly apolitical, and their focus is on access to basic services. If Houthis can guarantee that, this group would surely support them.  The increase in electricity, and the general perception that Houthis will protect the area has increased their support for the group.

Civil war is coming: many people are simply afraid of a potential civil war. For example, those in Sanaa who recently witnessed dead bodies rotting in the streets, slept through nights of loud and ongoing explosions, and had their daily life briefly came to a halt are terrified. They fear the unknown and the potential of a civil war, due to potential increase of retlation by AQAP, especially since the Houthis vowed to fight them.

Bye bye Ali Mohsin!: Some, such as many in the South, are simply ecstatic that General Ali Mohsin, known for his bloody and corrupt past, is forced out of power. Everything else seems irrelevant to them.

Saleh's plot: this group is worried that former President Saleh is behind the Houthi’s rise to power, and that Yemen would go back to square one.